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0002-9that we need to distinguish between experts and expertise as requiring
two distinct modes of analysis that are not reducible to one another. It
analyzes expertise as a network linking together agents, devices, con-
cepts, and institutional and spatial arrangements. It also suggests re-
thinking how abstraction and power were analyzed in the sociology
of professions. The utility of this approach is demonstrated by using it
to explain the recent precipitous rise in autism diagnoses. This article
shows that autism remained a rare disorder until the deinstitutional-
ization of mental retardation created a new institutional matrix within
which a new set of actors—the parents of children with autism in al-
liance with psychologists and therapists—were able to forge an alter-
native network of expertise.seminal The System of Professions, Andrew Abbott ð1988, pp. 2–3,
criticized the mode of narration prevalent in the sociology of profes-sions, which followed the ideal typical “life history” of a profession. Abbott
called instead for a history not of groups but of “tasks and problems”
ðp. 314Þ, a history without a protagonist in the sense that the story it told
would not be governed by projecting backward the necessary formation of
1The author wishes to thank the AJS reviewers whose insightful comments proved in-
valuable in clarifying and sharpening the argument of this article. Thanks are also dueAJS Volume 118 Number 4 (January 2013): 863–907 863
ndan Hart, Eric Klinenberg, and Dan Navon for commenting on various versions
paper. Direct correspondence to Gil Eyal, Department of Sociology, Columbia
rsity, 1180 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, New York 10027. E-mail: ge2027
mbia.edu
3 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
602/2013/11804-0001$10.00
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
a professional group nor by presumed functional identity between profes-
sion and task. While Abbott’s approach has proven quite influential and
American Journal of Sociologyinsightful, I will argue in this article that it fell short of his own call to do a
history of “tasks and problems.” Jurisdiction being the “link between a
profession and its work” ðAbbott 1988, p. 20Þ, the focus in this approach
has been on who has control and of what kind over a task, while leaving
aside the question of what arrangements must be in place for a task to be
accomplished and through what processes these arrangements were cre-
ated. To follow Abbott’s own call for a history of tasks and problems, I
will argue, requires an approach that complements the analysis of juris-
dictional struggles with tracing how forms of expertise—analyzed as
networks that link together objects, actors, techniques, devices, and institu-
tional and spatial arrangements ðCambrosio, Limoges, andHoffman 1992Þ—
are gradually assembled.2
This attempt to respond to Abbott’s call by introducing even more layers
of complexity would be of no utility if it cannot be shown to shed light on the
problems with which sociologists grapple. Therefore, the theoretical argu-
ment will be conducted by means of an empirical case study. The question I
would like to tackle is how to explain the precipitous rise—from estimated
prevalence of 1 in 2,500 in 1989 to 1 in 88 currently ðCenters for Disease
Control and Prevention 2012Þ—of autism spectrum disorder ðASDÞ diag-
noses, a group of developmental disabilities with onset typically before
three years of age, involving impairments in social interaction and commu-
nication, as well as the presence of restrictive and stereotyped patterns of
behaviors, interests, and activities. This is a puzzle that other social scien-
tists have been trying to solve as well ðNadesan 2005; Grinker 2007; Bear-
man and King 2009; Liu, King, and Bearman 2010; Silverman 2012Þ.
Explanations for the autism “epidemic” typically fall into two types. On
the one hand, there are naturalist explanations that treat the rise in the num-
ber of ASD diagnoses as indicating a real increase in the number of cases
2There are two bodies of sociological research that could be construed as tackling the
same question but that ultimately share the limitations of the sociology of professions. The
medicalization literature ðZola 1972; Conrad and Schneider 1980Þ focuses on the process
by which moral, social, or legal problems become redefined as medical problems, while
the social problems tradition ðBlumer 1971; Gusfield 1981; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988Þ
analyzes processes of collective definition that frame problems as worthy of public atten-
tion. Thus, the focus in both approaches is on the question of jurisdiction—who gets to
own a problem—while the emergence of problems is usually analyzed as a process of at-
tribution. Something is a social problem, argueHilgartner andBosk ð1988, p. 53Þ, not be-
cause it is an objective and identifiable condition that has intrinsically harmful effects but
because such effects have been collectively attributed to it. As I will argue below, the ap-
proach developed in this article, focusing on the arrangements and conditions necessary
for problems to become objects of expert labor, is geared precisely to overcome this oppo-
sition between what is real/objective and what is merely attributed/socially constructed.
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caused either by environmental toxicity ðRoberts et al. 2007Þ, vaccines
ðBernard 2004Þ, or even TV watching ðWaldman, Nicholson, and Adilov
Origins of the Autism Epidemic2006Þ. Social constructionist accounts, on the other hand, explain the rise
in the number of ASD diagnoses as a function of changed diagnostic crite-
ria; increased awareness of autism among parents, teachers, and experts;
greater availability of services from 1991 onward when autism was added
to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ðIDEAÞ; the interests
of parents in a less stigmatizing diagnosis that affords greater access to ser-
vices; lobbying on the part of parents’ organizations; and networks of influ-
ence among relatively privileged parents living in proximity to one another.
All these combine to increase autism prevalence primarily through diagnos-
tic accretion and substitution from mental retardation ðMRÞ to the “low
functioning” pole of the spectrum, and from language and learning disabil-
ities to its “high functioning” pole ðFombonne 1999; Croen et al. 2002; Prior
2003; Yeargin-Allsopp et al. 2003; Shattuck 2006; Coo et al. 2008; Grinker
2007; Bishop et al. 2008; King 2008; Bearman and King 2009; Caruso 2010;
Liu et al. 2010Þ.3
Both types of explanations, however, are unsatisfactory. Naturalist ex-
planations lose much of their plausibility when one learns that diagnostic
criteria for autism had been successively broadened just before the epi-
demic began—first in 1987, with the publication of DSM-III-R, then in
1994 with DSM-IV ðGrinker 2007Þ.4 To this one must add that ASD is ex-
tremely heterogeneous. To give the reader a sense of this heterogeneity,
as well as the range of symptoms that get classified as ASD, I draw below
on DSM-IV ð1994; see the appendixÞ diagnostic criteria for autistic disor-
der to describe four distinct types, loosely inspired by Wing and Gould
ð1979Þ:
3“Diagnostic accretion” means that a child with MR diagnosis acquires also an ASD di-
agnosis as comorbidity. “Diagnostic substitution”—in a strict measurable sense—means
that a child gets his diagnosis changed from MR to ASD. In this article, I am using the
term “diagnostic substitution” in a less precise andmore general sense of a child receiving
ASD diagnosis who in the past would have been likely to be diagnosed asMR.While it is
very hard, perhaps impossible, to accurately estimate such substitution, the foregoing
historical analysis is designed to show that it is a highly plausible interpretation of the
quantitative evidence.
4The DSM-III-R criteria dropped the requirement that onset of symptoms would be be-
fore 30months of age. The diagnostic criterion of “complete lack of social responsiveness”
was changed to simply “abnormal social responsiveness.”Most important, as we shall see
later, the internal structure of the threemain diagnostic criteria was changed to reflect the
understanding of autism as a spectrum. Children could receive the diagnosis by scoring
on anywhere between 6 and 12 items that were arranged in decreasing order of severity.
This structure was kept in DSM-IV ðthough the early onset criterion at 36 months was
reinstated—see the appendixÞ, which added, however, the diagnosis of Asperger’s dis-
order for children whose intelligence and speech development were normal but who
manifested deficits in social interaction.
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1. In the most severe cases, the trio of impairments in communication,
social interaction, and “restrictive and stereotyped pattern of behav-
American Journal of Sociologyior”manifest as “total lack of spoken language” and profound aloof-
ness and indifference in most situations, accompanied by repetitive
self-stimulatory behaviors such as hand flapping and head banging.
There is almost certainly comorbidity with MR ðcurrently estimated
to be from 38% to 62% of the autism caseloadÞ and potentially also
epilepsy. At this level of severity, the male to female gender ratio is
about 2:1 ðVolkmar, Szatmari, and Sparrow 1993; Amiet et al. 2008;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012Þ.
2. At a lower level of severity, children may be able to speak, but in ste-
reotyped and idiosyncratic phrases, often repeating how they were
addressed without reversing the pronouns. Yet, their parents often
report that they developed normally during the first 12–18months of
life and then suddenly regressed. They are typically indifferent to-
ward other children but not toward adults, whose company they ea-
gerly seek, though failing to use nonverbal communicative behaviors
such as eye-to-eye gaze to regulate the interaction and insisting in-
flexibly on the repetition of certain routines. As a rule, the male to fe-
male ratio increases as severity decreases, though exactly how much
for this type is impossible to estimate.
3. At yet a lower level of severity, children would be able to speak and
learn, and would not be diagnosed with MR but would evince an
“unusual learning profile indicating scatter in cognitive skills”
ðCDC 2009, p. 15Þ. They might have exceptional skills in arithme-
tic but fail miserably at reading comprehension. They would be
verbally and socially passive, seemingly unable to “initiate or sus-
tain a conversation with others” though amiable when approached
and affectionate with their parents. They would be content to watch
spinning wheels over and over again, yet would display unusually
strong reactions to specific noises or textures, and the explosive tan-
trums that follow often earn them a concurrent diagnosis of “emo-
tional disorder.” They could also be suffering from some gastroin-
testinal or sleep disorder.
4. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum would be mostly boys—
the male to female ratio at this level of severity is the oft-repeated
4 to 1 or higher ðGillberg 1998; CDC 2012Þ—who are “active, but
odd” ðWing andGould 1979, pp. 14–15Þ, namely, they are highly ver-
bal and intelligent, but they tend to be intensely preoccupied with a
relatively narrow set of interests such as train schedules; and they
make active social approaches but in inappropriate ways, seeming
to lack emotional reciprocity. At a younger age, these boys would dis-
play a “lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play.” Later, they
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may receive a concurrent diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder ðADHDÞ.
Origins of the Autism EpidemicThis heterogeneity has led many scientists to suggest that autism is not
really “a single syndromewith highly variable severity” but “an aggregate of
specific disorders that share some common ½behavioral features” ðRapin
1994; Ronald et al. 2006; Szatmari et al. 2007;Waterhouse, Fein, andNichols
2007, p. 308; Abrahams and Geschwind 2008; Pettus 2008Þ. It strains credu-
lity, therefore, to argue that some natural cause has increased the prevalence
not of one syndrome but of a whole aggregate of disorders, yet of only these
disorders and not related others ðmost importantly MR, with which ASD
shares practically all genetic loci identified thus far ½Betancur 2011Þ.
Social constructionist explanations, by comparison, are more plausible
but, ultimately, just as unsatisfying. They do not solve the puzzle of the au-
tism “epidemic” but merely push back the burden of explanation. If changed
diagnostic criteria are the proximate cause, for example, the question obvi-
ously becomeswhywere they changed?Was it because science has now come
to understand autism better or because of “medicalization,” that is, because
the psychiatric profession sought to expand its jurisdiction and in the process
redefined the odd and socially awkward as a social problem? The reader can
see that the opposition between naturalist and social constructionist explana-
tions has now been resurrected within this line of explanation. The debate
has not been resolved or pushed forward but is replicated in a quasi-fractal
fashion ðAbbott 2001Þ.5
In what follows, I would like to advance a different explanation for the
autism “epidemic,” one that avoids this fractalization by inverting the orig-
inal question. Instead of askingwhy autism ismore prevalent now, I suggest
that we ask first why autism was rare in the past. This line of questioning
immediately draws our attention toward the conditions that are necessary
for autism to be identified, differentiated, and diagnosed on a large scale. As
we shall see below, as long as very young children were institutionalized in
large residential institutions for the retarded there was hardly any way, or
point, to distinguish between autism and retardation. This is why I will ar-
gue that the deinstitutionalization of mental retardation—a lengthy process
that began in the early 1970s and lasted at least two decades—was a key
cause leading to the autism epidemic. Deinstitutionalization erased the old
categories that reflected the needs of custodial institutions ðfeeble minded,
5The essential problem can be stated as follows: social contructionist theories argue that
something becomes a problem not because of its objective nature but because of subjec-
tive attribution. Since many attributions are possible, they need to posit a selectionmech-
anism that decides which attributions fare better. The selection mechanism itself may be
construed objectively—involving nature, truth, efficiency, etc.—or subjectively as the
power of the medical profession to impose its definitions ð“medicalization”Þ or as compe-
tition for public attention ðHilgartner and Bosk 1988Þ, and so on to infinity.
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mentally deficient, moron, idiot, imbecileÞ while creating instead a new in-
stitutional matrix—community treatment, special education, and early in-
American Journal of Sociologytervention programs—wherein autism could be identified, differentiated,
and multiplied.
Deinstitutionalization, however, was not an external cause, a deus exma-
china, changing the trajectory of autism from without. From the moment
that autismwas first named and diagnosed by Leo Kanner in 1943, it repre-
sented a problematization of the distinction between mental retardation
and mental illness. Its history was one of “reiterated problem solving”
ðHaydu 1998Þ, namely, how to define, observe, and intervene in a domain
of objects that were neither illness nor retardation. While Kanner made the
initial move in this series of reiterated problem solving, he could not turn the
problem he sketched into a task amenable to expert intervention. This was
not because he lacked jurisdiction—child psychiatry enjoyed relatively
unchallenged jurisdiction over childhood problems at the time—but be-
cause he could not assemble the necessary arrangements and actors to
create a network of expertise adequate to this task. In a sense, aswe shall see
later, he was limited precisely because of the jurisdiction enjoyed by child
psychiatry.
In this series of reiterated problem solving, deinstitutionalization was an
extremely significant episode because it provided the ecology within which
an alternative network of expertise could be assembled. The key actors in
assembling this network were not child psychiatrists, but the parents of
children with autism. Seeking to modify the relations within Kanner’s net-
work of clinical expertise, which expropriated their knowledge and stigma-
tized them as “emotional refrigerators,” they set up alternative mechanisms
of data collection and experimentation, which bypassed the clinician. To
do so, they allied themselves with behavioral psychologists and occupa-
tional therapists who, due to their peripheral position, developed thera-
pies that blurred the distinction between mental illness and retardation as
well as the distinction between lay and expert. It was this new actor-
network, composed of arrangements that blurred the boundaries be-
tween parents, researchers, therapists, and activists, that was finally able
to “solve” the problem. The combination of this new actor, the new ecol-
ogy created by deinstitutionalization, and the capacity of the therapies to
secure the cooperation of the patients themselves, is what led to the autism
“epidemic.”
The next section develops the theoretical approach guiding this analysis
by drawing a series of contrasts between the sociology of professions and the
sociology of expertise. The main point is not to demonstrate the superiority
of one approach over the other but to argue for their complementarity,
namely, that only by combining the analysis of how networks of expertise
are assembled with jurisdictional analysis can we conduct a history of tasks
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and problems. It is followed by a necessarily abbreviated historical narra-
tive substantiating the argument made above about the causes for the au-
Origins of the Autism Epidemictism “epidemic” while demonstrating how the theoretical approach devel-
oped here could inform a history of tasks and problems.FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY
OF EXPERTISEPerhaps it is best to start with themost obvious point and build upon it. The
sociology of professions—even in its broadest rendition—is too narrow to
deal with what Abbott’s subtitle termed “the division of expert labor” in
contemporary society. Jurisdictional struggles are waged not only between
established professions but also between any groups that can lay a claim to
expertise, whether on the basis of a body of abstract knowledge ðAbbott’s
minimalist definition of professionsÞ, control of technique ðwhat he calls
“crafts”Þ, or perhaps other bases ðAbbott 1988, p. 8Þ. Moreover, recent stud-
ies have documented in ample detail that lay people as well may play an im-
portant role in addressing technical problems that are normally understood
as professional jurisdiction ðEpstein 1995, 1996; Wynne 1996; Rabeharisoa
and Callon 2004Þ.6
So the first point is that a history of tasks and problems must be able to
take into account the wider scope of actors designated by the term “exper-
tise.” But there is more to the term “expertise” than just a wider scope. It
derives from the Latin root experiri, “to try,” and typically means know-
how, the capacity to get a task accomplished better and faster because one
is more experienced, “tried” ðexpertus; Williams 1976Þ. “Profession,” on the
other hand, derives from the term for the vows or public declarations taken
upon entering a religious order. Let me suggest, therefore, another advan-
tage of the term “expertise”: it permits us to make an analytical distinction
between experts and expertise; between, on the one hand, the actors who
make claims to jurisdiction over a task by “professing” their disinterest,
skill, and credibility and, on the other hand, the sheer capacity to accom-
plish this task better and faster.
6 Indeed, it is quite possible that the word “expertise” has come into wide usage precisely be-
cause of this historical change and the widened scope of jurisdictional struggles. UsingGoo-
gle BooksNgramViewer tool, I found that the term “expertise” is quite recent, its wide usage
dating from the mid-1960s, while the term “expert” entered public discussion much earlier,
1880–1920 ðsee http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content5expert%2C1expertise%
2C1profession&year_start51800&year_end52000&corpus50&smoothing53Þ. I would ar-
gue that the 1960s are when the relative dominance enjoyed by the established professions
during the first half of the 20th century was challenged. Once the number of contenders for
expert status increased and the basis for their claims became more heterogeneous, the word
“expertise” began to be used, because the question was how to determine whose claim is le-
gitimate.
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In terms of this distinction, the sociology of professions has been pri-
marily a sociology of experts and has had comparatively little to say about
American Journal of Sociologyexpertise. As Collins and Evans ð2007, p. 2Þ note, the sociology of profes-
sions typically treated expertise as an attribution, a quality that the experts
possessed by virtue of recognition granted by significant others and thereby
reducible to their interests, role sets, and modes of organization. This em-
phasis on attribution and the struggle for recognition is also characteristic
of studies of medicalization and the construction of social problems
ðZola 1972; Aronson 1982Þ. Hence the focus of the sociology of professions
on organizational form: credentialing, licensing, and the formation of pro-
fessional associations and lobbying outfits are all calculated to secure the
recognition of significant others and enforce it with a legal mandate. This
has been a hugely insightful and profitable hypothesis, but it is also partial.
A sociology of expertise, on the other hand, would begin from the recogni-
tion, as Nikolas Rose ð1992, p. 356Þ put it, that “the social consequences of
psychology ½read expertise are not the same as the social consequences of
psychologists ½read experts,” that is, that experts and expertise are not re-
ducible to one another and require two distinct, though combinable, modes
of analysis.
If expertise stands for the capacity to accomplish a task better and faster,
it may seem obvious that it should be analyzed, therefore, as a real and
substantive skill possessed by an individual, typically by virtue of being
socialized into a group of similar experts. This is the approach that has
been taken by Collins and Evans ð2002, 2007Þ as well as by Dreyfus and
Dreyfus ð1986, 2005Þ. Beginning from Wittgenstein’s critique of the no-
tion of “following a rule,” they emphasized the “background of practices
which are the condition of possibility of all rule-like activity” ðDreyfus
1979Þ. While the acquisition of expertise begins with learning a set of
rules, what differentiates the true expert from the merely competent, or
“contributory expertise” from “interactional expertise,” is the embodied and
tacit mastery of this background of practices, the “form of life” shared by the
“core set.”
While this approach is much closer to the etymology and colloquial
meaning of “expertise,” ultimately it is unsatisfactory. The first point is that
treating expertise as substantive skill possessed by an individual or a group
inevitably involves the sociologist in playing the normative role of deciding
who is or is not an expert, assigning differential worth to competing claims
and performances. Collins and Evans ð2007Þ embrace this normative role
and claim that in a world of vaccine scares and global warming controver-
sies it is indispensable that someone play this role. I have severe doubts,
however, that sociologists can play this role without themselves becoming
embroiled in a controversy about their own expertise and credentials.
Put differently, by assuming this normative role Collins and Evans implic-
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itly acknowledge that expertise is not only a real and substantive skill
but also a claim and an attribution, only they present themselves as posses-
Origins of the Autism Epidemicsing the expertise necessary to make the correct attribution.7 Indeed, as is
obvious in the case of Dreyfus, the substantivist approach to expertise is not
only a descriptive account of what experts do but also a spirited defense
of human experts against encroachments on their jurisdiction from artifi-
cial intelligence and expert systems. If it was not Collins or Dreyfus mak-
ing these claims about expertise involving “an understanding of rules that
cannot be expressed” ðCollins and Evans 2007, p. 17Þ, but a doctor testify-
ing in court, wouldn’t we be suspicious?
The second, more analytical, point is simply this: if we want to account
for the superior and speedy execution of a task it is not enough to focus on
the actors and their skills. Clearly, a full account of anything but the most
rudimentary task must include, at a minimum, also the tools and devices
used in the performance of the task ðand therefore also the makers of these
devicesÞ. Very likely it requires also analyzing the contributions made by
other experts, front-line workers, perhaps even lay people, and the mecha-
nisms by which their cooperation has been secured. The problems that the
task addresses are foregrounded and made observable and actionable by
certain institutional and spatial arrangements ðincluding regulatory agen-
cies and standardsÞ, while other arrangements obscure them from view or
impede addressing them. Finally, the observations and interventions of the
experts are organized by means of certain concepts, and these too may
prove important when accounting for the way in which a problem is made
relevant or a task is executed. This complexmake-up of expertise is typically
much more evident when it is still “in the making” and alternative devices,
actors, concepts, and arrangements are still viable candidates for formulat-
ing the problem or addressing it. Once a form of expertise has been devel-
oped, however, this complex make-up is obscured by a process of “black
boxing” and standardizing that makes it appear as if expertise is embodied
by the expert ðCambrosio et al. 1992, pp. 347–49Þ.
Put differently, if—as the substantivist approach emphasizes—any
rule-like performance is only explicable by reference to a “background of
practices” that are its “condition of possibility,” then a full explication of
expertise must explore indeed this background of practices and the social,
material, spatial, organizational, and conceptual arrangements that serve
as its conditions of possibility. This approach has been pioneered by Foucault
ð1972, 1973Þ and underlies a great deal of the work in science studies, espe-
cially actor-network theory ðANT; Latour 1987, 1988, 1999; Cambrosio et al.
1992; Keating and Cambrosio 2003; Lakoff 2005Þ.
7Put differently, this is the mirror image of the problem faced by social constructionist
theories and leads to similar fractalization.
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So there are two distinct questions and modes of analysis. On the one
hand is the question of jurisdiction, namely, who has control and to what
American Journal of Sociologydegree over a set of tasks ðAbbott 1988, p. 20Þ. On the other hand is the
question of expertise, namely, what arrangements must be in place for a
task to be accomplished. This distinction extends to the mode of historical
investigation and narration. Abbott suggested that historical investiga-
tion into the emergence of professions should start with neither a group,
nor a set of tasks, as neither is a given, stable entity preceding the forma-
tion of the contingent link between them, namely, the jurisdiction. In-
stead, one must trace “the assemblage of various sites of difference . . . into
a set of boundaries in the topologically strict sense” ð1995, p. 872Þ. Each
site of difference, or “proto-boundary,” is an event, arising out of local in-
teraction and potentially ephemeral. The central question, therefore, is how
these events are “yoked together” and acquire stability as a jurisdictional
boundary between those who do, and those who do not, control a particular
set of tasks ðp. 868Þ. This is a nonteleological, fully “eventful,” history of pro-
fessions, but note that it is focused on the question of how jurisdictions are
formed, that is, how the “who” and the “what” ðthe “things”Þ of a relation-
ship of control ðthe “boundaries”Þ are formed.
A history of tasks and problems, however, should not be reduced to trac-
ing the assembly of jurisdictions. A complementary line of investigation be-
gins with the expert performance or statement itself, understood as an event
ðFoucault 1972, pp. 88–105; Summerson Carr 2010Þ, and asks not who is
authorized to do or say it but what conditions are necessary for this event,
and not another, to have taken place.What are the conditions necessary for
this event to be repeated in regular fashion? Finally, what are the conditions
and arrangements necessary for the statement/performance to be dissemi-
nated, to become an “immutable and combinable mobile” ðLatour 1987,
p. 227Þ that can be transported from one site to another without deforma-
tion? In this way, the process of “black boxing” and standardization can be
reversed to trace the other actors ðeven if they do not control any identifi-
able part of the task at handÞ, equipment ðespecially transcription devicesÞ,
institutional and spatial arrangements, and concepts of which a form of ex-
pertise is composed.
Because it is easier to understand a tool by using it, I postpone further dis-
cussion of this mode of analysis to the next section, where I will attempt to
demonstrate that it can shed light on the causes for the autism “epidemic.”
For the moment, I would simply like to make a few points about it. First,
while a history of the formation of jurisdictions analyzes the yoking to-
gether of differences into a boundary, a history of expertise analyzes the as-
sembly of complementarities into an apparatus ðdispositif Þ that produces,
reproduces, and disseminates expert statements and performances. Put
differently, if we follow the event of expert statement or performance to the
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conditions and mechanisms involved in its formulation, replication, and
dissemination, we end up with a view of expertise neither as an attribution
Origins of the Autism Epidemicnor as a substantive skill but as a network connecting together not only the
putative experts but also other actors, including clients and patients, de-
vices and instruments, concepts, and institutional and spatial arrangements
ðCambrosio et al. 1992, p. 345Þ.
Second, the distinction between the two aforementioned questions and
modes of historical analysis is analytical. As we shall see, jurisdictional
struggles often play an important role in setting up or impeding the condi-
tions necessary for expert statements and performances to be formulated,
repeated, and/or disseminated. By the same token, the process by which lo-
cal differences are yoked together into a jurisdictional boundary can be sig-
nificantly impeded or furthered by the relations of complementarity needed
to forge a network of expertise. We shall see later how this observation ap-
plies to Kanner’s attempt to use autism as a way to unify the jurisdiction of
child psychiatry.
The third point is that this mode of analysis is suited both for an ethno-
graphic analysis of expert work practices, provided that it is historically
informed, and a historical genealogy of how a form of expertise emerged,
provided that it is ethnographically motivated. This study belongs to the
second genre, but the main point is that by treating the expert statement/
performance as a historical event and tracing its conditions of possibility,
the lines between ethnography and history are blurred. Opening the black
boxes of which a form of expertise is made and tracing the network of asso-
ciations contained therein, one is going both backward to “expertise in the
making” ðCambrosio et al. 1992Þ and “sideways” to increasingly obscure
and ignored aspects of expert work practices.
Thinking of expertise as network, I believe, can also shed light on one of
the central debates in the literature about the character of expert knowl-
edge, namely, whether it is practical or abstract. As we saw earlier, when
Collins and Evans ð2007Þ or Dreyfus and Dreyfus ð2005Þ treat expertise
as a substantive skill, they emphasize the embodied and tacit mastery
of practices that serve as background for rule-like activity. When sociolo-
gists of professions, on the other hand, treat expertise as attribution, they
underline abstraction as the distinctive way in which professions make
claims. As Abbott argues, while crafts compete by controlling techniques,
professions compete by controlling the abstractions that generate tech-
niques, and this is what makes professions ultimately stronger: “Only a
knowledge system governed by abstractions can redefine its problems and
tasks, defend them from interlopers and seize new problems” ðAbbott 1988,
pp. 8–9Þ.
This opposition is mediated by means of auxiliary concepts. Collins and
Evans ð2007Þ introduce the concept of “interactional expertise” specifically
873This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
because they recognize that expert knowledge exists also in an explicit, dis-
cursive form composed of more general propositions. Similarly, Abbott
American Journal of Sociologyð1988, pp. 102–3Þ argues that too much abstraction spells weakness and
renders a profession unable to defend its jurisdiction from interlopers.
The relationship between abstraction and the control a profession is able
to exercise over its jurisdiction is an inverted U-curve with the most con-
trol obtained at some “optimal” level of abstraction. This is very insightful
but ultimately indicates that the concept of “abstraction” is relying on an un-
specified auxiliary concept to explicate the role abstraction plays in jurisdic-
tional struggles. The problem is that we have noway of knowingwhat is the
optimal level of abstraction unless by hindsight, unless by the fact that the
group was successful in defending its jurisdiction. Instead of gesturing at
hypothetical values such as “too much,” “too little,” or “optimal,” we need
a way of taking abstraction apart and investigating what it is made of.
One way of doing so is to replace “abstraction”with the notion of “immu-
table and combinable mobile” and investigate the chain of transcriptions by
which an expert statement or performance is conveyed along the network
toward its “centers of calculation” ðLatour 1987, 1999Þ. Each link in the
chain consists of altogether practical devices and concrete forms of reason-
ing, yet each transcription means that the statement/performance loses cer-
tain qualities it possessed before and acquires new ones, until it gradually
becomes mobile, combinable and “liquid” in the sense connoted by the term
“abstraction” ðLakoff 2005Þ. This approach, moreover, permits us to make
qualitative distinctions between different forms of abstraction. Abstraction
in laboratory science, for example, consists of a fully two-way chain of tran-
scriptions. While each transcription subtracts references to local and prac-
tical details it does so in a way that permits one to trace it backward to these
details. Legal abstraction, on the other hand, consists of only a one-way
chain of transcriptions, with the possibility of returning to local details in-
tentionally cut off because of the supreme value of preserving legal stability
ðLatour 2010Þ. Abbott’s original insight about the optimal level of abstrac-
tion could, therefore, be preserved by investigating how long these different
chains of transcriptions are; whether they can be traced backward or not;
what qualities are added and subtracted along the way; how secure are the
links, the transcriptions, from being taken apart by challengers; what other
actors, devices, and arrangements were involved in constructing each link;
and how their cooperation is secured.
The final distinction I would like to draw is between how the sociology of
professions and the sociology of expertise each conceptualize and analyze
power. In the sociology of professions, power is analyzed as a set of mecha-
nisms designed to control the supply of and demand for professional services.
The origins of this approach are inWeber’s ð1963Þ classic analysis of the dy-
namics of religious domination as a struggle over the supply and demand for
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salvation goods. Among sociologists of professions, Friedson ð1970, 1986,
pp. 63–73Þ, for example, distinguishes between occupational credentialing
Origins of the Autism Epidemicðlicensing, educational credentials, certification by professional associationsÞ
that controls the supply of professional services and institutional credential-
ing ðchartering, accreditationÞ that controls the demand for professional ser-
vices. Similarly, abstraction plays such an important role in Abbott’s ð1988Þ
analysis because it stands as shorthand for mechanisms that reduce the de-
pendence of the professional group on a specific context, or technology, or
group of clients and allow it to maximize ðif “optimal”Þ control over demand
for its services. Power, therefore, is understood under the twin forms of mo-
nopoly and autonomy.Monopoly over its knowledge base permits the profes-
sional group to control the supply of its services, while autonomy in defining
the significance and relevance of its knowledge permits it to control the de-
mand for its services.
Weber’s ð1963Þ original analysis, however, wasmore subtle. For a priest-
hood to exercise long-term domination over the laity, it needs to balance its
monopoly over the interpretation of the scriptures ði.e., control over supplyÞ
and the emphasis on otherworldly salvation ði.e., control over demandÞ
with pastoral ministering that involves instructing and educating the laity
ðto combat the influence of prophetsÞ and supplying it with everyday salva-
tion goods ðto combat the competition from magiciansÞ. Put differently,
if demand is defined too autonomously, the services offered by the experts
become irrelevant to the needs of their clients; while if supply is controlled
by a strict monopoly, expert knowledge becomesmeaningless for the clients.
In both cases, the putative attributes of power prevent a certain give-and-
take—exchange or dialogue—that is crucial for securing the cooperation of
the clients.
When power is analyzed not from the point of view of the actors, the
group of experts, but from the point of view of expertise, that is, the point
of view of putting together a network that produces, reproduces, and dis-
seminates expert statements or performances, the focus shifts indeed to
the mechanisms that secure the cooperation of the clients, as well as the
other parties involved. Even in the textbook case of professional monop-
oly, namely, medicine, conversation analysts have documented the dialogic
structure of the medical interview, with the outcome of diagnosis and pre-
scription crucially dependent on the interaction between doctor and patient
ðHeritage and Maynard 2006Þ, while Gadamer ð1996, p. 111Þ argued that
“doctors are becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which their work
is dependent on the contribution made by the patient.” Power then consists
in exactly the opposite of monopoly and autonomy, namely, “generosity”
and “co-production.”By “generosity” Imean, followingRose ð1992Þ, the op-
posite of monopoly, namely, that a network of expertise, as distinct from the
experts, becomes more powerful and influential by virtue of its capacity to
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craft and package its concepts, its discourse, its modes of seeing, doing, and
judging, so they can be grafted onto what others are doing, thus linking
American Journal of Sociologythem to the network and eliciting their cooperation. Psychological expertise,
as distinct from psychologists, is strengthened not by restricting the supply
of expertise but by extending it, so that mangers or educational experts, for
example, borrow freely from its conceptual apparatus and draw on its
methods to boost their own authority. By “co-production” Imean, following
Rabeharisoa and Callon ð2004Þ, the opposite of autonomy, namely, that a
network of expertise becomes more powerful and influential by virtue of in-
volving multiple parties—including clients and patients—in shaping the
aims and development of expert knowledge. Medical expertise, as distinct
from medical doctors, is strengthened by letting patients take part in deci-
sions about the direction of research and the aims of medical intervention,
that is, by allowing the demand for medical expertise to be coproduced. In
both cases, power consists not in restriction and exclusion, but in extension
and linking ðFoucault 1975, 1976Þ.
The point of these considerations is not to refute the valuable analyses of
professional monopoly and autonomy but to suggest that the power of ex-
perts and the power of expertise require different modes of analysis and
may be linked to one another in complex and surprising ways. Epstein
ð1995, p. 424Þ noted the irony attending the struggles of AIDS activists,
who, even as they won credibility as experts and managed to introduce im-
portant modifications in trial design, also found themselves accused of be-
ing co-opted and furthering the agenda of themedical establishment. Could
we not say, then, that even as the power of the experts, the monopoly and
autonomy of medical doctors, was diminished, the power of medical exper-
tise was in fact augmented by the activists because now “people with AIDS
and HIV infection would willingly participate in the trials and conform to
the protocols,” that is, now there was amechanism of exchange that secured
patients’ ðand experimental subjects’Þ cooperation? Could we not say the
same about the recent trend in self-diagnosis, greatly assisted by the Inter-
net and by the spread of evidence-based medicine? Doctors may lose juris-
diction, but the network of medical expertise is extended via generosity and
dialogue. A similar argument has, in fact, been made by Whooley ð2010Þ
about the DSM: by making psychiatric diagnosis transparent and stan-
dardized, it has weakened the autonomy of individual psychiatrists, but it
has greatly increased the authority of psychiatry or, in my language, has
extended and strengthened the network of psychiatric expertise.
By the same token, monopoly and autonomy may serve to prevent the
extension of a network of expertise andweaken it. Given that expert perfor-
mances crucially depend on dialogue and exchange within networks of ex-
pertise, monopolymust be understood not only with respect to occupational
credentialing but also as a local feature of the network, how it arranges the
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flows of information and credibility. To possess a monopoly means to occu-
py an “obligatory point of passage” ðLatour 1988, pp. 43–49Þ to which flow
TABLE 1
Dimensions of the Contrast between the Sociology of Expertise and the
Sociology of Professions
Sociology of Professions Sociology of Expertise
Scope Limited to professions and
would-be professions
Inclusive of all who can
make viable claims to
expertise





different modes of analysis
What is privileged? Organizational and institutional
form: credentialing, licensing,
association, etc.
What experts actually do.
The capacity to perform a
task better and faster than
others
Question Jurisdiction: who has
control over a task?





How local differences are
yoked together into a
jurisdictional boundary
How complementarities are
assembled into an apparatus
that produces expert
statements/performances
What is expertise? Attribution, a formal qual
ity reducible to actors’
interests




Abstraction The most distinctive char
acteristic of professions is




for a chain of practical
transcriptions. Different
forms of expertise abstract
differently, because their
chains are different






Origins of the Autism Epidemicall the information and contributions from the other nodes of the network.
Aswe shall see in the next section, this was the position occupied byKanner,
the discoverer of autism, in the network of clinical expertise. Yet precisely
because of this arrangement, Kanner lacked mechanisms to secure the co-
operation of the clients—specifically the parents of children with autism. It
was only when the parents challenged the authority and credibility of the
clinician and rearranged the relations within the network around circuits
of generous exchange and dialogue that autism expertise was able to extend
itself and become strong.
Table 1 summarizes the set of contrasts I drew in this section between the
sociology of professions and the sociology of expertise. In the following sec-
tion, I propose to narrate the history of autism expertise and explain the
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causes of the contemporary epidemic by following the event of an expert
statement backward to the conditions andmechanisms necessary for its for-
American Journal of Sociologymulation, replication, and dissemination.TRACING THE STATEMENTAs noted earlier, there is a great deal of agreement even among medical
researchers that the proximate cause for the autism epidemic were the
changes in diagnostic criteria for ASD in DSM-III-R ð1987Þ and DSM-IV
ð1994Þ. The latter are presented in the appendix. Instead of treating them
as evidence for psychiatric jurisdiction over autism, I would like to treat
them as an expert statement and ask what conditions permit one to formu-
late this statement, repeat it, and put it into wider circulation. What is the
“network of production and stabilization” upon which the existence of the
statement in its repeatable, mobile, and combinable materiality is contin-
gent ðLakoff 2005, p. 32Þ?
This is, as I said earlier, an ethnographically motivated history. The data
it draws upon are primarily historical and consist of secondary sources about
the treatment of mental retardation, autism, and childhood schizophrenia in
the United States from 1943—when autism was first reported—to the pres-
ent. It is also supplemented by documents from the archive of the National
Society for Autistic Children ðNSACÞ at Washington, D.C. ð1965 to the
presentÞ and other parent-generated sources such as autobiographies, the
“Parents Speak” section of the Journal of Autism and Developmental Dis-
orders ð1971 to the presentÞ, and the online archive of the newsletter of the
parent-basedAutismResearch Institute ð1986–2006Þ.While this researchwas
ongoing, I was also involved with a research group that conducted 35 inter-
views with parents of children with autism, observed multiple diagnostic
and therapeutic sessions, and trolled the vast terrain of autism-related online
discussion groups and blogs. The data from this more contemporary research
are not reported here in any systematic fashion, but they have motivated the
questions I ask of the historical data and the lines of investigation pursued.
Between Mental Illness and Mental RetardationExamining DSM-IV diagnostic criteria in the appendix, we can ask: What is
this statement about? We are told that it is about a “disorder,” or several dis-
tinct “impairments,” or about “abnormal functioning” ðA1, A2, BÞ, but al-
ternatively that it is also about quite specific “delays” ðA2a, BÞ and be-
haviors “inappropriate to developmental level” ðA1bÞ, with this point
about the disorder being “developmental” underscored by the requirement
that onset be prior to age three ðBÞ. Some of these delays overlap considerably
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with a global cognitive deficit ðA2aÞ, but others do not ðA1bÞ. Moreover, the
format of a checklist makes the presence of the condition a matter of relative
Origins of the Autism Epidemicdegree ð6 of 12, etc.Þ. It thus militates against identifying it with mental re-
tardation yet makes it possible for ASD and MR to be concurrent diagno-
ses. Primacy is implicitly given ðby priorityÞ to an impairment in “social
interaction,” but the terms used to describe it—“use,” “behaviors” “regu-
late,” “reciprocity”—studiously avoid implication of an emotional disorder or
psychosis. In short, for this statement to be formulated it needs to exist in
relation to a correlative domain of objects ðFoucault 1972, pp. 40–49, 91Þ
that are “developmental disorders” or “developmental disabilities”; that is,
they are neither mental illnesses nor MR but in hybrid fashion combine
some elements from each. This directs the analysis to the institutional con-
ditions that are necessary to make such objects observable and differentia-
ble. In particular, it led me to look at the deinstitutionalization of mental
retardation in the 1970s as a crucial watershed moment. The term “de-
velopmental disabilities,” in fact, was first used in 1970 by Congress as part
of the legislation that began the process of deinstitutionalization ðAkerley
1979, p. 222Þ.
From this point of view, the answer to the question why autism was rare
in the past is that the institutionalization of children deemed “mentally re-
tarded” acted as a barrier to the identification and differentiation of autism.
Without engaging in dubious “retroactive diagnosis,” it is still possible to
state that contemporaries thought that there were many autistic children in-
stitutionalized as mentally retarded ðKanner 1943, p. 33; 1949, pp. 11, 27–28;
Rimland 1964, p. 13; Medical World News 1966Þ, and they offered some an-
ecdotal evidence to support this claim ðKanner 1971, p. 144Þ. The more im-
portant point, however, is that the institutional matrix of custodywas simply
indifferent to the distinction between MR and autism. IQ testing typically
played a marginal role in the process of commitment ðNorsworthy 1906,
p. 77; Kanner 1949, p. 3; 1964, pp. 122–23; Wallin 1949, pp. 43–62; Clausen
1966, pp. 731, 741–42Þ, which instead focused on the social and legal fact of
“social incapacity” ðTredgold 1947, pp. 1–6; Wallin 1949, pp. 20–36; Noll
1995, pp. 30–33Þ. The very concept of mental deficiency, to be precise, was
a medicolegal interpretation of the practice of locking up those who were
“socially incapable” and from this point of view the distinction between au-
tism and MR was meaningless. Put differently, since the observations and
interventions of the experts were organized by means of the concept of “so-
cial incapacity,” the problem of autism could not be formulated within the
institutional matrix of custody. Moreover, the institutional and spatial ar-
rangements of custody offered no basis for observing or differentiating au-
tism since overpopulation and neglect at the residential institution produced
what looked like autistic symptoms on a massive scale—withdrawal, indif-
ference, and self-stimulatory behaviors were widely understood to be reac-
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tions to institutional environments seen also in psychiatric patients or prison
inmates ðSpitz 1945Þ.
American Journal of SociologyAutism, consequently, was discovered by Kanner on the margins of the
institution. In his seminal article he presented the cases of 11 children, of
whom he said “several . . . were introduced to us as idiots or imbeciles, one
still resides in a state school for the feebleminded, and two have been pre-
viously considered as schizophrenic.”All 11 children were white and middle
class. Crucially, their parents brought them toKanner because they disputed
the diagnosis of feeblemindedness given to their children.Kanner concurred:
“Even though most of these children were at one time or another looked
upon as feebleminded, they are all unquestionably endowed with good cog-
nitive potentialities” ðKanner 1943, pp. 33, 39Þ.
Autism, put differently, was theway inwhichKanner sought to problem-
atize the prevailing conceptual, institutional, and jurisdictional distinction
between mental retardation and mental illness. Illness was opposed to re-
tardation as a form of social incapacity that was temporary and rectifiable.
Tredgold ð1947, p. 1Þ likened the mentally ill to a person in “temporary fi-
nancial embarrassment,” while the mentally deficient he compared to the
poor who never had any possessions, that is, the first had a right to be re-
stored to the sanity they once possessed and “good potentialities” to do so,
while the latter did not. The treatment of mental illness was “restorative”
in the sense that it aimed at a “cure,” that is, at a spontaneous restoration
of the native powers of the ill person that acts as a multiplier of however
much time and resources were invested in treatment. Care for the mentally
retarded, on the other hand, was deemed nonrestorative. The condition
was inborn, so there was no prior state to be restored, and, more impor-
tant, one could not count on a multiplier effect, since there was no “good
cognitive potential.” Retardation is not illness, declared a psychiatric text-
book, but simply slowness, like a bottle that is filled through a clogged
funnel ðLangone 1974Þ. Consequently, there would be diminishing returns
for the time and effort of intervention. Treatment, therefore, aimed not at
a cure but at the minimum necessary for enlightened custody.
Jurisdictionally speaking, the small group of psychiatrists who served as
superintendents of residential institutions for the retarded and played a
leading role in the American Association on Mental Deficiency ðAAMDÞ
were relatively isolated from the mainstream of the profession that dealt
with mental illness. This was especially true when it came to the treatment
of children. Despite the initial focus of child guidance on “saving” immi-
grant and lower-class children liable to become delinquent, by the 1930s
there was a fairly clear jurisdictional division between the child guidance
clinics dealing with the behavior problems of the middle-class child, typ-
ically understood to be caused by emotional conflict and correctable by
dynamic therapy ðKanner 1964, pp. 141–42; Jones 1999, pp. 7–8; Nehring
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2004, pp. 371–72; Nadesan 2005, pp. 44–45, 58–73Þ, and the residential
institutions for the retarded taking in the “socially incapable,” typically
Origins of the Autism Epidemicadolescent “morons” from the lower rungs of society, whose feebleminded-
ness was understood to be a congenital “organic defect” predisposing
them to crime and sexual promiscuity ðMalzberg 1952, p. 35; Trent 1994,
pp. 141–81; Noll 1995, pp. 33–35; Kline 2001; Castles 2004, pp. 352–53;
Jones 2004, pp. 322–23, 348, n. 41Þ.
As the founder of child psychiatry in the United States, Kanner saw this
division of labor as a major obstacle. While he worked squarely within the
tradition of child guidance and was the first director of the first Child Psy-
chiatry Clinic in the United States at Johns Hopkins Hospital, he also in-
sisted that “it’s a luxury . . . to give child guidance only to intelligent chil-
dren” and that “occupation with mental deficiency” is one of the “integral
functions” of child psychiatry ðKanner 1964, pp. 142–43Þ. At the same time,
he also thought it was high time to modernize the field of mental deficiency
and recognize that the feebleminded were not a homogeneous group
ðKanner 1949, pp. 6–11Þ. In short, Kanner’s discovery of autism must be
understood within the context of his effort to bring mental deficiency and
child guidance together within a unified jurisdiction for child psychiatry, to
“yoke together” these differences into a defensible boundary. No less impor-
tant, it must also be understood as a way of aligning the interests of the
fledgling new specialty with those of middle-class parents—telling them
that their children were not feebleminded but possessed “good cognitive
potentialities.”
This became apparent a few years later, when Kanner ð1949, pp. 4, 10–
11, 17, 20Þ introduced a distinction between absolute, relative, and “ap-
parent feeblemindedness.” The latter category included cases where some
specific delay, injury, disability, or illness masked the otherwise consider-
able intellectual potential of the children affected and made them seem
feebleminded. They were in need not of institutionalization but of careful
diagnosis and therapy, which would “not only bring hidden potentialities
to light but can also do something to turn the discovered potentialities into
realized actualities.” Kanner thought that infantile autism underlay
many of the cases of apparent feeblemindedness. He thus crafted autism
as a wedge with which to open up a space between illness and retardation
and to outline a radically new set of tasks for child psychiatry involving, as
he put it, “human engineering” ðKanner 1949, pp. 29–31Þ, namely, surveil-
lance of the full range of childhood ailments, from problem behaviors to ill-
ness to feeblemindedness, and assignment to different tracks on the basis of
careful diagnosis and therapy.
So we have Kanner already in 1949 attempting to bring into being this
hybrid or interstitial domain of objects that are neither illness nor retarda-
tion. Yet this vision only came to fruition in the 1970s, and not through
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Kanner’s own efforts. In fact, by the mid-1960s Kanner was arguing that
autism was being overdiagnosed and that it was a distinct and rare ill-
American Journal of Sociologyness; that is, he completely inverted his position from 1949 ðKanner 1965,
p. 414Þ. What happened in the interim? Should we chalk it up to the in-
consistencies and foibles of one man? I do not think so. To understand what
happened we need to return to the fact that for his 11 cases in 1943 Kanner
relied on middle-class parents to bring their children to him and that the
diagnosis of autism was calculated to secure their allegiance and support.
I said earlier that the yoking of differences into a jurisdictional boundary
can be significantly impeded by the inability to stabilize a network of ex-
pertise. This is exactly what happened in the fraught relations between
child psychiatrists and middle-class parents.
Between Expert and LayReturning to the appendix, we can ask another simple question: Who can
formulate, repeat, and modulate this statement? Not simply who has the
authority to diagnose autism, though this is an important part of the in-
quiry, but what actor-network or “enunciative modality” ðFoucault 1972,
pp. 50–55, 95Þ is necessary for these diagnostic criteria to make sense? Note
that some of the criteria can be obtained by firsthand observation in a natu-
ral situation ðA1a, A2a, A2c, A3cÞ; others require setting up a semistructured
testing situation,most likelywith the assistance of a parent or caregiver ðA1c,
A2b, A2d, A3dÞ; while others could only be scored by obtaining information
from parents and/or educators and therapists ðA1b, A1d, A3a, A3bÞ. Where
observation is involved, it requires an appropriate physical setting and toys;
it requires setting conditions of visibility and invisibility ða two-way mirror,
a closed door, a video cameraÞ; and it requires a transcription device, typi-
cally a standardized interview/observation schedule—this is crucial for mak-
ing the statement repeatable and transportable. This directs the analysis to
the relations between clinicians and parents and to the mechanisms, devices,
and spatial arrangements that organize the flows of information and attribu-
tion between them.
The main data used by Kanner and those who followed him to diagnose
and describe autism were, in fact, parental reports. Kanner observed the
children during their relatively short visits to his office and administered
or improvised a few tests, but the relevance of these was always in doubt
ðKanner 1943, pp. 11, 15Þ. Ultimately, his detailed case studies relied heavily
on what the parents reported: for example, a typed 33-page detailed his-
tory provided by one father, detailedmonthly letters or “copious notes” pro-
vided by some of the mothers ðpp. 1–2, 6–8, 12Þ. We could say, therefore,
that the actor-network producing clinical diagnoses included, at a mini-
mum, both the clinician and the parents and that at least implicitly there
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was a problem of attribution ðLatour 1987, pp. 118–19Þ: If both sides were
making contributions, to whom should the diagnosis be attributed? The
Origins of the Autism Epidemicnetwork of clinical expertise, however, included several mechanisms that
attributed the diagnosis to the clinician rather than the parents. First, there
was the closed door of the clinician’s office. When the child was seen by the
clinician, the parents often had to wait outside ðKanner 1943, p. 7Þ. What
happened inside wasmysterious. So even though they furnishedmost of the
observations, the diagnosis could still be attributed to what happened be-
hind the closed door. Second, there was the—fairly short—chain of tran-
scriptions. The parents spoke, or provided detailed diaries and logs, and the
clinician wrote it all down in his notes, transcribing or “abstracting” ðp. 6Þ
only what he considered important. These notes, whichwere used towrite a
case summary justifying the diagnosis, were not usually seen by anybody
apart from the clinician. However short the chain of transcriptions, there-
fore, it was not easy to trace it backward to the parents’ story. Third, there
was the fact that the clinician occupied a central node in the network into
which flowed also the observations of referring physicians, interns, or ex-
perts at various residential schools or child study homes ðpp. 17–19Þ. Finally,
there was “mother blaming,” that is, a style of interpretation inherited from
child guidance ðSchumacher 1946, p. 53; May 1958, pp. 121–22; Jones
1999, pp. 7–8; Brockley 2004, pp. 148–49Þ that downgraded the credibility
of parents’ reports even while drawing on them. In the 1943 article, Kanner
used the word “obsessive” at least seven times regarding parents and con-
cluded by suggesting that the detailed diaries, reports, and remembered de-
velopmental minutiae he obtained from the parents “furnish a telling illus-
tration of parental obsessiveness” ðp. 42Þ. Considering that he described one
of the two distinguishing characteristics of autism as “anxiously obsessive
desire for the maintenance of sameness” ðp. 36Þ, he seemed to be creating
an intimate link between the parents’ psychological makeup and their chil-
dren’s, a link that could be interpreted genetically or psychogenically but, in
either case, precluded any straightforward return along the chain of tran-
scriptions to the parents’ reports. Indeed, he later insinuated that perhaps
the parents were the cause of the disorder: “We find almost invariably that
the children have been brought up in emotional refrigerators in which there
was extremely little fondling and cuddling, in which the infants have been
treated more as coldly watched and preserved experiments than as human
beings enveloped in the warmth of genuine parental affection” ðKanner
1949, p. 27Þ.
Mother blaming has often been interpreted as one of the excesses of psy-
choanalysis, but Kanner ð1941Þ was scathingly critical of psychoanalysis.
Mother blaming is better understood as a device that had a precise function
to play in the network of clinical expertise. It permitted the clinician to ap-
propriate the parents’ work, erase their contribution by discrediting the
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credibility of their testimony, turn it into his clinical insight ðSullivan 1984,
p. 239Þ, and then direct it back at them as a power of accusation. The chain
American Journal of Sociologyof transcriptionswas thus oneway. It stopped at the clinician’s office,which
functioned as an obligatory point of passage ðLatour 1988, pp. 43–49Þ. Ar-
ranging the flows of information and attribution in this way, Kanner the ex-
pert enjoyed something very similar to the image of professional power as
monopoly, but the network of clinical expertise remained weak precisely
because it lacked power as generosity that could secure the parents’ coop-
eration. Or put more precisely, however strange it may seem to us today,
mother blaming was simultaneously a mechanism for channeling the
flows of attribution in the network to the clinician and a form of generosity
meant to secure the cooperation of parents. As physician JacquesMay ð1958,
pp. 124–25Þ—himself a father of autistic twins—observed, parent blaming
enjoyed popularity even among the parents because it gave hope that a cure
is possible and removed the stigma of organic defect akin to retardation.
Moreover, parent blaming is a confessional form of power ðFoucault 1976Þ.
It works by stigmatizing individuals as sinners but also by eliciting their
confession and teaching them to view themselves through the categories
taught by the confessor. As May ð1958, pp. 126–27Þ acutely observed, the
bond formed between therapist and parents “has some deep, unhealthy
charm. Centuries ago most religions discovered the importance of confes-
sion and the considerable help and lift that could be derived from a public
or private catharsis of one’s sins.” For this reason, mother blaming played
a crucial role in forging the distinctive identity of “autism parents,” first be-
cause it distinguished their brand of affliction as “middle class” ðunlike re-
tardationÞ, but second and more important, because it was through resis-
tance to this confessional power that the parents were led to rearrange the
relationships within the network of clinical expertise.
It should be noted from the outset that many of the parents involved in
this process were professionals in relevant fields. A key role was played by
Bernard Rimland, a navy psychologist and father of an autistic boy, and in
the United Kingdom by LornaWing, a child psychiatrist and the mother of
an autistic girl. Among the other mothers involved there were special edu-
cation teachers and nurses. This fact should be interpreted in the context
of the jurisdictional struggle between psychiatry and psychology ðand other
subordinate professions—special education, occupational and speech ther-
apy, etc.Þ, which intensified during these years ðAbbott 1988, pp. 311–13Þ.
It should not be taken, however, to imply that the parents were “really”
professionals struggling for jurisdiction. Rather, the parents of autistic
children were in the unique position of being linked both to forces that
challenged psychiatry and combined in the deinstitutionalization and
“normalization” movement a few years later, namely, the larger middle-
class movement of parents of retarded children ðTrent 1994, pp. 253–66Þ
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and the subordinate professions. Precisely for this reason they were able
to forgeacompletelynew network of expertise organized around the fig-
Origins of the Autism Epidemicure of the parent-researcher-therapist-activist.
The keymovewas to go around the obligatory passage point occupied by
the clinician, redirect the flows of information away from it, and turn the
chain of transcriptions into a two-way road. In 1964, Bernard Rimland
published a book, Infantile Autism, which challenged the psychogenic hy-
pothesis and is widely acknowledged today as a forerunner of modern au-
tism research. More important for our purposes, however, was the insert at
the end of the book. It was a checklist—that is, a transcription device—that
parents could fill, tear out, and send back to Rimland. Within a week of
publication, Rimland began receiving completed checklists from parents
containing detailed individual histories of their children, descriptions of
symptoms, and the timing of their appearance. He found a way, in short,
to redirect the flow of information that until now was monopolized by the
clinicians so that it flowed to him. Rimlandwould score the form and return
the result, alongwith an analysis of the child, back to the parents. The chain
of transcriptions, therefore, could be traced backward as Rimland spoke
at length with parents over the telephone, explaining the results ðRimland
1968, 1971Þ.
Initially, Rimland did not know how to help the parents who sent check-
lists. The following year, however, he heard about Ivar Lovaas, a behavioral
psychologist at UCLA, who was developing a method for the treatment
of autistic children. After meeting Lovaas and observing him at work,
Rimlandwas so impressed that he introduced Lovaas to local parents of au-
tistic children and even tried the method on his own son ðRimland 1972Þ.
Why was Lovaas interested in collaborating with parents? Working with
autistic children was so time consuming and labor intensive that Lovaas
developed the principles of applied behavioral analysis ðABAÞ working
with only one autistic girl, Pamela. He had no numbers to make even his
fellow psychologists listen to him. As he himself put it in a retrospective
account, “you do not get tenure” doing this type of academically uninspiring
work. As he came to appreciate the amount of work involved, he realized
that he needed a whole army of paraprofessionals. He turned, therefore, to
parents, saying that “this means that we will have to give away our pro-
fessional skills to lay people, and the sooner the better” ðLovaas 1993,
p. 628Þ.
Note the explicit language of generosity used by Lovaas in this retrospec-
tive account. The resulting circuit of exchange and dialogue went thus: par-
ents provided Rimland with their reports by filling out the checklists. Rim-
land gave them back a score and brief report explaining what the answers
said about their child. He also gave them directions on how to treat their
children with ABA and similar therapies. At the founding meeting of the
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parents’ organization, the National Society for Autistic Children ðNSACÞ,
Rimland gave a speech based on his observations of Lovaas emphasizing
American Journal of Sociologythat this was a “technique that parents could learn with demonstrable suc-
cess” ðRimland 1972, p. 573; Warren 1984, p. 102; Lane 2008Þ. Through
NSAC and a newsletter started by Rimland, parents were able to exchange
information about what worked and for whom. Rimland often followed up
on these leads and reported on what he found—this was how he came to
advocate megavitamin therapy ðRimland 1971, p. 57; 2006Þ. By the same
token, Lovaas gave his knowledge and methods to parents. As we shall see
later, ABA not only addressed a great many of the everyday problems par-
ents faced, it also worked to secure the begrudging cooperation of the chil-
dren themselves ðPark 1974Þ. In return, Lovaas obtained not only an army
of paraprofessionals but also the ability to sum up the results of multiple
home experiments, each with an “n of 1” ðLerner 2006Þ, to make his claim
for the efficacy of his therapy stronger. In parent-run special schools as well
as at their homes, parents adopted behaviorist tools for recording and
charting observations, thus rendering results measurable in exquisite de-
tail and constructing a fully two-way chain of transcriptions ðLettick 1979,
pp. 145–49; Silverman 2004, p. 158Þ. In this alternative network of exper-
tise, no single node could control and appropriate the exchange as the clini-
cian did previously. At its core was not a mechanism of monopolization but,
on the contrary, a generous exchange that extended the network and
increased its power by valorizing the expertise of parents. In his retrospec-
tive account of the development of ABA, Lovaas ð1993, pp. 622–28Þ calls
parents his “colleagues” and declares that “there are no ‘experts’ in this
field.” Indeed, the new autism expert was no longer the clinician, but neither
was it the behavioral psychologist, it was rather a team or an actor-network
composed of therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and parents, with the
latter occupying the leading role.
Within this network, the alliance between parents and psychologists
worked to undo the mechanisms that earlier protected the monopoly of
the clinician. The psychologist Eric Schopler—whose Treatment and Edu-
cation of Autistic and Related Communication-Handicapped Children
ðTEACCHÞ became a statewide program in North Carolina due to lobby-
ing by the local chapter ofNSAC ðPark 1971, p. 4Þ—subjectedmother blam-
ing to scathing critique, arguing that the coldness observed by Kanner was
not a cause of autism but the consequence of having to raise a child who did
not reciprocate the parent’s emotional overtures ðSchopler and Reichler
1976, p. 355Þ. Psychiatrists were unable to see this, he said, because theywere
baffled by autism, secretly frustrated, and needed a scapegoat on whom
to pin the failure ðSchopler 1971bÞ. In short, he completely inverted the at-
tribution of credibility and expertise. Psychiatrists were not credible, while
parents’ reports were the best data to be had ðSchopler and Reichler 1972Þ.
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This reapportioning of credibility was complemented by a simple mate-
rial device Schopler added to autism programs in North Carolina, a one-
Origins of the Autism Epidemicway glass screen that permitted parents to watch clinicians and therapists
working with their children without being seen ðSchopler 1971a; see also
Fields 1975Þ. The one-way screen, said Schopler, takes away “the mystique
and unfounded authority” of the therapist. Gone were the days when
parents waited anxiously outside the closed door of the clinician’s office.
Now they saw exactly what the therapist did, and they quickly learned to
discriminate between superior and inferior performances. They were as-
signed the role of “cotherapists” within TEACCH and many quickly came
to surpass the therapists who originally trained them. The one-way screen
was a physical device that rewired the flow of information within the new
network of expertise, leaving no room formonopoly or scapegoating. Today
clinicians are encouraged to let parents watch the evaluation of their chil-
dren, since their observation “demystifies” it and helps “establish a long-term
collaborative relationship” ðKoenig et al. 2000, pp. 304–5Þ. Rimland’s
checklists worked similarly to establish transparency and remove the mys-
tical authority of the clinician. Using them, he was able to show that out of
445 children who saw two different clinicians only 55 received the same
diagnosis ðRimland 1971, pp. 165–66Þ.
One way of reading the story told in this section is that it was about ju-
risdictional struggles—thoughwith awider cast of characters. Child psychi-
atry was challenged by an alliance composed of competing professions and
its very own clients, who forced it to share jurisdiction over autism diagno-
sis and therapy. After Rimland, psychologists developed more checklists—
the Autism Behavior Checklist ðABC; Krug, Arick, and Almond 1980Þ and
the Childhood Autism Rating Scale ðCARS; Schopler et al. 1980Þ—draw-
ing on the sameprinciple of being a two-way transcription of parents’ reports
bypassing the psychiatrist. No less important, in later years NSAC came
to exert a strong influence over shaping the diagnostic criteria for autism
ðRitvo, Freeman, and National Society for Autistic Children 1978; Akerley
1979Þ, while ABA became a therapeutic juggernaut far outstripping psy-
chiatric treatments for autism ðGreen et al. 2006Þ.
Sociology of expertise, however, has to attend to both parts of the story.
While the experts, the child psychiatrists, have lost their monopoly, the re-
wired network of expertise became stronger, able to secure the cooperation
of parents and, equipped with ABA therapy, even the begrudging cooper-
ation of the patients themselves. Kanner’s monopoly rendered his network
unstable, and the one-way chain of transcriptionsmeant that the statements
he produced were not easily reproducible. Indeed, the field of child psychi-
atric diagnosis was extraordinarily balkanized, with each clinician special-
izing in his or her own pet diagnosis and none able to achieve liquidity
ðHersch 1968; Ornitz and Ritvo 1968Þ. This situation was completely
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changed by the checklists, the systems of observation and measurement
central to the functioning of the rewired network. Ultimately, psychiatry
American Journal of Sociologywould incorporate these into its arsenal, especially with the DSM-III ð1980Þ,
which was explicitly designed to guarantee diagnostic reliability in response
to studies like Rimland’s demonstrating lack of agreement among clinicians.
Most important, the rewired network was far better equipped to realize
Kanner’s original vision, which he himself was forced to abandon. Another
way of reading the story told in this section, therefore, is as an episode in a
series of reiterated problem solving ðHaydu 1998Þ. Kanner sketched a
domain of objects between illness and retardation and the problem of how
to define, observe, and intervene in these. He envisioned the task of the child
psychiatrist as distinguishing among the full range of childhood ailments on
the basis of “practical, communal, educational and clinical possibilities for
human engineering” ðKanner 1949, pp. 9–11Þ. Yet without securing the
cooperation ofmiddle-class parents he had no chance of realizing this vision.
In terms of resources it required a program of intensive therapy and follow-
up extending over many years, yet child guidance clinics were few and far
between, treating no more than 12,000 children by 1960 ðNehring 2004,
pp. 371–80Þ. The clinical network of expertise was simply unsuited to handle
large volumes ðHersch 1968, p. 498Þ, but as Lovaas, Schopler, and Rimland
demonstrated, a network that outsourced this labor to parents as “cothera-
pists” would be equal to this task. Similarly, what Kanner envisioned—
distinguishing between the absolutely, relatively, and apparently feeble-
minded and assigning some to institutions, others to menial occupations, and
others to intensive treatment to actualize their potential—was tantamount to
medical diagnosis of social destiny, something for which child psychiatry
lacked the necessary legitimacy. The rewired network, on the other hand, es-
pecially in the context of deinstitutionalization,would disperse it ontomultiple
local authorities—psychologists, therapists, special education teachers, and
most important to the parents themselves as “experts on their own chil-
dren”—and multiple local decision points where “adjustment and treatment
possibilities”would be assessed but the diagnosis of social destiny postponed.
Between Cure and CustodyReturning to the appendix, we can ask another question about the state-
ment contained in it: What can be done with it? How does it render its sub-
ject matter actionable and to what end? It is extremely instructive, at this
stage, to compare it with Eisenberg and Kanner’s ð1956Þ distillation of Kan-
ner’s observations into two “cardinal symptoms”: “extreme aloneness” and
“preoccupation with the preservation of sameness.”While the cardinal symp-
toms are general, phenomenological, meaningfully interlinked ðaloneness
could be interpreted as an extension of the need to maintain samenessÞ, and
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emotionally tinged ð“preoccupation” harks back to “obsessive”Þ, the DSM-
IV criteria describe autism in granular detail, breaking it down into “items
Origins of the Autism Epidemicof autistic behavior” ðWing 2008Þ that are not necessarily connected with
one another and could be worked upon separately. Most important, the
first two sets of criteria are organized by a comparison to normal develop-
ment of skills or abilities for social interaction and communication.While the
cardinal symptoms rendered autism a “fortress” to be broken into, inviting
images of heroic cure ðBettelheim 1967Þ, DSM-IV criteria describe a set of
loosely connected disabilities, ranged by the degree of delay they represent,
to be addressed by the gradual building of skills. This directs the analysis to
the relations between therapists ðor parent “cotherapists”Þ and the patients
themselves, and the techniques, devices, and arrangements that secured the
latter’s cooperation.
These relations were fundamentally changed by deinstitutionalization.
The first point is that the deinstitutionalization of mental retardation meant
that young children, however disabled, remained at homewith their parents.
The proportion of intellectually disabled children and youth in all out-
of-home placements peaked in 1965 at about 49% and then began declining
to 37% in 1977 and 18% in 1987 until it reached 6.2% in 2005, with the pro-
portion of children under 14 only 1.8% ðProuty et al. 2005Þ. There was a
“concerted effort by most states to restrict the admission of children to large
state institutions” ðProuty, Smith, and Lakin 2007, p. 41Þ.
The second point is that deinstitutionalization replaced custody with a
new set of legally mandated goals for treatment. In 1970, the National As-
sociation for Retarded Children ðNARCÞ persuaded Congress to introduce
a new grouping of handicapped individuals, the “developmentally dis-
abled,” who were characterized as needing neither “cure” ðbecause their
condition was chronicÞ nor “rehabilitation” ðsince they never experienced
normal developmentÞ but simply “habilitation,” that is, enabling, making
able. Congress also created a new category of treatment facility, the “inter-
mediate care facility—mental retardation” ðICF-MRÞ. The term “interme-
diate” indicated precisely that it was neither a medical acute care facility
nor a custodial one, but onewhich provided treatment geared for habilitation
ðAkerley 1979; Shapiro 1993, pp. 20–23; Prouty, Smith, and Lakin 2001,
chap. 8Þ. The principle behind these reforms was “normalization,” or “letting
the mentally retarded obtain an existence as close to the normal as possible.”
It implied a complete recasting of the goal of treatment when it comes to
developmental disabilities ðWolfensberger 1972, pp. 27, 96Þ.
Thus, deinstitutionalization created a changed institutional terrain in
which the family, surrounded by support services, became the preferred lo-
cus for the diagnosis and treatment of children with developmental disabil-
ities. In this institutional terrain, the object crafted by Kanner could come
into a much sharper relief. Just as autism was indistinct within the institu-
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tion, so now, within the new institutional matrix of early intervention, com-
munity treatment, and special education the distinction between the socially
American Journal of Sociologycapable and incapable was rendered meaningless. The goal was to habili-
tate the children, to increase their ability to “obtain an existence as close to
the normal as possible,”which meant that everybody had to be “socially ca-
pable” in a different sense: interactive and communicative at home, in the
classroom setting, and with age peers. Similarly, in this new milieu the net-
work of expertise developed by the parents could thrive. It had a built-in
advantage over all other networks since it had already established solid
links inside the family home, as a site of surveillance, diagnosis, experimen-
tation, and therapy.
Yet to be able tomake these fine distinctions in terms of abilities for social
interaction and communication, as we saw in the appendix, the parents’
network of expertise needed to draw upon techniques of habilitation that
could elicit also the cooperation of the children themselves. I have already
described how Ivar Lovaas and his ABA therapy became linked to the par-
ents’ network of expertise. Now I would like to argue that the new behav-
ioral, sensory, and educational therapieswere able to attach also the patients
themselves to this network, thereby increasing its power and extension. This
is not an argument that these therapies are better suited to treat autism. The
contemporary landscape of autism treatment is a smorgasbord of more
than a hundred different therapies ðGreen et al. 2006Þ and a heated debate
about their efficacy ðRutter 1983; Howlin 1997; Rogers and Vismara 2008Þ.
From the point of viewof the sociology of expertise, however, therapy should
be analyzed as a set of mechanisms for translating the interests, securing the
cooperation, andmanipulating the performances of patients so as to stabilize
a network of expertise. It was in this sense that the new therapies were supe-
rior. In the process, they also completely transformed autism as an object of
diagnosis and intervention, preparing the ground for its rapid expansion
afterward.
This argument could be profitably illustrated by means of a comparison
with childhood schizophrenia. If any condition was ripe to become an epi-
demic in the 1960s, it was not autism but childhood schizophrenia. Mosse
ð1958, p. 791Þ reported “an enormous increase in the diagnosis of childhood
schizophrenia,” and Bender ð1953, pp. 663–64Þ claimed that it was even
“more common than generally supposed.” Yet, already by the early 1970s
therewere grave doubts raised about the validity of childhood schizophrenia,
and by the end of that decade it was definitively relegated, as Rutter ð1972,
p. 315Þ suggested, to “the section on the history of psychiatry.” Why would
childhood schizophrenia go from “enormous increase” to virtual oblivion
in a matter of 20 years? I would argue that the key to the answer was
the prescribed treatment for childhood schizophrenia: sixmonths of hospital-
ization, in the course ofwhich the patients had to endure 20 rounds of electro-
890This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
convulsive shock therapy and/or Metrazol ðwhich induced convulsions;
Bender 1953, pp. 666, 678Þ.
Origins of the Autism EpidemicSuch therapy was not calculated to translate the interests or secure the
cooperation of either the parents or the patients themselves. The parents
were excluded from the process of diagnosing and treating their children,
who were literally taken away from them and hospitalized. The treatment
that the patients received was not only harsh but also standard issue, one
size fits all. To compound matters, the patients were typically minority
adolescents who were referred to treatment after being labeled “juvenile
delinquents” because of suspected gang membership or truancy. After dis-
charge, they were typically still tagged with a “behavior disorder” diagno-
sis, and the side effects of the treatment were often evident ðMosse 1958,
pp. 791–92Þ. No wonder, then, that the parents eventually refused to play
their assigned role. Bender ð1953, pp. 668–69Þ reported that she was find-
ing it harder and harder to persuade parents to give their permission to
treat their children with electric shock. Put differently, because the treat-
ment of childhood schizophrenia emulated the medical model of acute
care—hospitalization-treatment-discharge—securing the cooperation of
patients and parents was completely staked upon obtaining a “cure,” and
when it failed to materialize the initial begrudging cooperation turned into
open resistance.
Now, behavioral, educational, and sensory therapies also do not cure au-
tism, but they do a much better job of translating the interests of patients
and parents and securing their cooperation. They do this by rejecting the
medical model of illness and cure, as well as the model of enlightened cus-
tody, and instead direct their efforts at habilitation goals that are copro-
duced with the parents and that permit the child to become better integrated
within the family, school, and community. ABA, for example, breaks the
behavior of autistic children “apart into smaller units ðself-destruction, im-
itation, vocalizations, units of grammar, labeling, etc.Þ” and attempts to
shape each one separately. The target of treatment, therefore, is not autism
ðwhich they regard as a “hypothetical” entity ½Lovaas 1979, p. 315Þ, but
concrete behaviors to be modified, skills to be acquired, or basic postural,
vestibular, or perceptual mechanisms to be jump-started. The techniques
apply across categories to all developmentally disabled children. The point
is not to cure autism but to provide building blocks for cognitive and psy-
chic growth so that it “will become sufficiently camouflaged . . . to be unno-
ticeable” ðSchopler and Reichler 1971; Ayres 1974, pp. 56–62; Lovaas 1979,
pp. 320–21; 1981, p. xÞ. These therapies, therefore, seek to translate the in-
terests of parents from a desire for “heroic” cure to an appreciation for tan-
gible improvements in functioning, self-determination, and quality of life.
As Lovaas ð1981, p. 3Þ put it: “Set small goals so both you and your child
will be rewarded. Find pleasure in small steps. Do not struggle for an abso-
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lute and unattainable ideal of normalcy.” Ultimately, the cooperation of
parents is secured because they are included as “cotherapists” and, unlike
American Journal of Sociologythe medical model of cure, setting the standards and defining the goals of
therapy is coproduced between parents and experts.
No less important, these therapies also work assiduously to secure the co-
operation of the children themselves. It is worth quoting at length here the
report by David Park ð1974Þ, father of an autistic girl, about the success
that he and his wife had in treating their daughter with “operant condition-
ing” at home. By breaking up tasks into their behavioral components, he
said, operant conditioning “concentrated the child’s attention on a few prob-
lems at a time” and “made no impossible demands” so “the child was sur-
rounded by success.” More important, “the child took a responsible part in
her own treatment” while “the system utilized and turned to advantage the
peculiarities of autistic children: their interest in systems, in counting, in rit-
ual, and their literal honesty” ðp. 190Þ. He concluded by underlining that
the “child . . . welcomes this liberation as much as the parents do. Elly has
told us so herself” ðp. 191Þ.
Compare the report by two occupational therapists on the results of using
sensory integration therapy with a young autistic girl at her school district.
Prior to therapy, the girl had lost “verbal contact with people and reality.”
Yet, after six months of tactile and vestibular stimulation ðincluding rub-
bing, brushing, spinning in a hammock-net, and riding prone on a board
scooterÞ there was marked improvement, as the girl began to “direct her
own therapy,” instructing the therapist to emulate the sounds of different
animals while she spun or “firmly directing a great deal of pretend play . . .
involving the therapists, classmates, and the therapeutic equipment” ðAyres
and Heskett 1972, pp. 178–80Þ.
I use these two stories not as evidence that these therapies were successful
in treating autism. For that purpose, they are purely anecdotal and worth-
less. The stories are useful, however, for the purpose of describing the com-
mon mechanisms employed by behavioral and sensory therapies, in the
context of deinstitutionalization, to elicit the cooperation of the patients.
First, treatment takes place in the children’s home or school environment,
is continuous with everyday activities, and is conducted not by medical
personnel but by parents or school personnel. Second, the goals of treat-
ment are modest, achievable, and pertain to everyday functioning, so not
only is the child “surrounded by success” but each success means further
integration in the activities of the family, school, and community. Com-
pared with these modest goals, however, treatment is intensive and in-
trusive, calculated to impinge upon the children’s initial resistance and
involve them in interaction. Indeed, if there is one thing that is common to all
autism therapies, notesGrinker ð2007Þ, is that they all involve “being in your
child’s face.” Schopler and Reichler ð1971, p. 94Þ called it “the adult’s non-
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specific impingement on the child,” and Rutter and Sussenwein ð1971,
p. 380Þ counseled that “the adult must intrude on the child in order to de-
Origins of the Autism Epidemicliberately engage him in interaction” ðsee also Medical World News 1966;
Siegel 1996, pp. 196–208Þ. Yet to achieve this intrusion, therapy seeks to graft
itself onto the “peculiarities” and concrete behaviors of the children and turn
them to its advantage. Park’s observations about the intrinsic charm of
counters, clickers, schedules, rituals, and “contingent reinforcement” for the
children have been echoed by others ðSiegel 1996, pp. 230–52Þ. Sensory in-
tegration therapy similarly builds on what children find enjoyable. “Fun,”
says Ayres ð1998, p. 7; see also Ayres 1983, p. 115Þ is the word that children
use for sensory integration.Most important, these therapies involve the chil-
dren as responsible participants in their own treatment. Park noted this fea-
ture as crucial to the success he achieved with his daughter. ABA therapists
added “child-directed” sequences, also called “incidental teaching proce-
dure,” to the protocol for working with autistic children to capitalize on the
interactions initiated by the children ðMcGee et al. 1985Þ. Similarly, we al-
ready saw how sensory integration proceeded with the girl beginning to “di-
rect her own therapy.” Ayres ð1983, pp. 127–28Þ often emphasizes that the
therapist needs to follow the child and not vice versa: “Occasionally, a child
seems to know more about the nature of his dysfunction and what to do
about it than the therapist does.” Finally, common to all these therapies is
that they individualize the patient, tailoring for each child a unique treatment
plan adapted to his or her deficits, strengths, and sensitivities.
No doubt these qualities of autism therapies enumerated here are par-
tially explicable by reference to jurisdictional struggle. The developers of
these therapies were psychologists and occupational therapists, who com-
peted with psychiatry. Yet the tactics that they chose cumulated not in
challenging psychiatry’s jurisdiction directly, nor in securing a new juris-
diction for themselves, but in blurring the boundaries between jurisdictions
ðbetween retardation and illness, for exampleÞ as well as between expert
and lay ðboth parents and patientsÞ. Outsourcing therapy to parents, pa-
tients, students, and paraprofessionals; permitting therapies to be combined
in a purely pragmatic manner ðSchopler and Reichler 1971, pp. 91, 95–100;
Lettick 1979, pp. 33–37, 78–80; Grandin 1995, p. 53; Siegel 1996Þ; down-
scaling their claim from curing autism to modifying concrete behaviors or
postural mechanisms; engaging in hands-on work continuous with thework
of parenting ðLovaas provided practical advice on toilet training and spank-
ing, for exampleÞ; all these tactics meant that the autonomy andmonopoly of
the experts was minimized, while maximizing the generosity and coproduc-
tion that bound together the network of expertise.
Summing up the state of the therapeutic art in 1983, Rutter ð1983,
pp. 210–11Þ noted that the main advance in the field of autism treatment
has been the rise of educational and behavioral methods of treatment that
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have replaced insight psychotherapy. The new therapies changed the site of
treatment from the hospital to the school and the home and involved par-
American Journal of Sociologyents as cotherapists. They broadened therapeutic goals in linewith the goals
of habilitation and normalization and were extended to ever younger chil-
dren. He also noted, however, that none of them could cure autism or sig-
nificantly undo severe initial handicaps of intelligence and language. The
success and spread of these therapies, therefore, was not due to their tech-
nical superiority but to the propitious ecology provided by deinstitutional-
ization and the social innovativeness with which they were able to graft
themselves onto the practices of parents and patients, translate their inter-
ests, and secure their cooperation.
The main consequence of the rise of the therapies and of their capac-
ity to secure the cooperation of patients is that they transformed autism
ð1Þ from a syndrome with “cardinal symptoms,” as Kanner called it, to a list
of “items of autistic behavior” that could be worked upon separately and
ð2Þ from a rare illness into a wide spectrum of social and communicative
deficits. Let me give a couple of examples of this dynamic. In the 1960s, it
was generally accepted that self-injurious behaviors, such as head bang-
ing and hand biting, were universal among autistic children ðRimland
1964, p. 59Þ. They were part of that obsessive turning upon oneself to main-
tain sameness and shut out the environment. In the DSM-III ð1980Þ, self-
injurious behaviors were still a key criterion for diagnosing pervasive de-
velopmental disorder. Yet, in the DSM-III-R ð1987Þ, they were merely an
“associated feature,” and in the DSM-IV ð1994Þ they were no longer men-
tioned. Two years later, a leading psychiatrist asserted that self-injurious
behaviors were quite rare in autism, yet she added that “it’s my clinical im-
pression that there is a lot less hand biting now than twenty years ago” ðSiegel
1996, p. 74Þ. What had happened in between is that self-injurious behaviors
began to be treated with behavior modification therapies and, consequently,
were discounted as outside the core symptoms of autism ðSiegel 1996; Scho-
pler 1978, p. 169Þ. A more central example is Kanner’s “cardinal symptom”
of “autistic aloneness” and utter lack of interest in other people. Both Kan-
ner and Rimland ð1964, p. 8Þ thought it was the main distinguishing feature
of autism. In DSM-III, one of the main diagnostic criteria was “pervasive
lack of responsiveness to other people ðautismÞ,” that is, it was so central as
to be essentially identified with the disorder. Yet in the DSM-III-R it was re-
placed by a variable of “qualitative impairment of reciprocal social interac-
tion” of which the aloofness and flat affect noted by Kanner were a possible
but no longer necessary component. Once again, the transformation was due
to the effect of the therapies. As we saw earlier, they are intensive and intru-
sive but seek to graft themselves onto the peculiarities and rituals of the chil-
dren. They established, therefore, an equivalency between the multiple ways
inwhich the communicative rapport necessary for therapy could break down
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and were able to make distinctions along a single scale between the very
few who were aloof and indifferent in all situations; those who liked merely
Origins of the Autism Epidemicphysical contact with others; those who were indifferent only toward other
children but not adults; those who were passive but amiable when ap-
proached; and finally those who made active social approaches but in in-
appropriate ways ðWing and Gould 1979, pp. 14–15; Wing 1997Þ.
These distinctions were not merely the result of applying the therapies;
they were also the result of thinking from the point of view of the therapies
and from the point of view between illness and retardation enabled by de-
institutionalization. This point of view was articulated most forcefully by
Lorna Wing. In a speech at NSAC’s annual conference she said it was
“pointless . . . to draw sharp lines between autistic and ‘not really autistic’
in educational practice. . . . The question to ask about each child is—what
are his handicaps, what are his skills andwhat canwe do to help him?” ðWing
1973, p. 118Þ. Instead of sharp lines, she “wanted to . . . see how much ½sic
items of autistic behavior, features of autistic behavior, how often they oc-
curred among children in general . . . approaching the thing bottom up, in-
stead of top down” ðWing 2008Þ. Looking at each “item” separately as the
therapists did, and letting it vary in accordance with how it responded to
therapy, she recomposed autism into a “triad” of impairments in language,
social communication, and behavior, each constructed as a spectrum ðWing
and Gould 1979Þ. She explained that “the justification for regarding . . .
½low-functioning and high-functioning cases as related is that all . . . require
the same kind of structured, organized educational approach” ðWing 1981,
p. 124Þ.
Similar triads and spectrums were developed around the same time by
Rutter ð1978Þ, Schopler et al. ð1980Þ, and Ritvo et al. ð1978Þ on behalf of
NSAC. ButWing chaired the committee that wrote the DSM-III-R criteria
eight years later, and her version was adopted ðWaterhouse et al. 1992Þ. In
her work, the lines of development I charted earlier all converged and
came to fruition in the most evident fashion. She was a British child psy-
chiatrist and trained clinician specializing in the object that Kanner out-
lined. Yet she was also the mother of an autistic girl and cofounder of the
British parents’ association, that is, she was an integral part of the new
agent represented by the parents’ network of expertise. At the same time,
she was running an active treatment program for children with communi-
cation problems, collaborating with educators and therapists, as part of the
British deinstitutionalization drive.
So over the long term, what happened between autistics and therapists
began to redefine what autism really was, both the boundaries and the core
of the syndrome. These changes were inscribed in new diagnostic checklists
ðSchopler et al. 1980Þ and in the work-arounds employed by clinicians even
before the DSM itself was amended ðWaterhouse et al. 1987; Whooley
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2010Þ. Then the new understanding was reported back to parents in books
such as Siegel’s, which meant that clinicians would indeed see in their of-
American Journal of Sociologyfices more or less what they knew they should be seeing. In this way, the
movement started by Kanner completed a full 180 degree loop and ended
up with a substantial revision of how autism looks and feels, is understood
and classified.ENDGAME: THE SELF-ADVOCATES AND DIAGNOSTIC
SUBSTITUTIONIan Hacking ð2009Þ argued that autistic self-advocates—individuals who
are “on the spectrum” yet capable of speaking for themselves and telling
others how it feels to have autism—played an important role in the dynamic
that led to the autism epidemic. They did this by writing memoirs and blogs
ðGrandin 1986, 1995;Williams 1992, 1994; Shore 2003; Tammet 2009Þ that
told of the experience of having autism and coping with it from their point
of view. Their writings were avidly read by parents, experts, and the gen-
eral public. In this way, the self-advocates created a language and a set of
mental images with which it became possible for the first time to represent a
“thick” autistic person, that is, one with emotional and cognitive depth,
whose actions are meaningful and intentional if hard to decipher. This sort
of language made the behavior of children with autism intelligible to par-
ents, experts, and conceivably also to children and adults with autism them-
selves ðShore 2003, p. 139Þ. There is hardly any doubt that the attention
garnered by the self-advocates and their capacity to render autistic behav-
ior intelligible contributed mightily to the autism epidemic.
I find Hacking’s argument extremely insightful, yet it leaves completely
unexplained the appearance of the self-advocates themselves. There is good
reason for approaching this question cautiously: anybody who reads their
memoirs cannot fail to recognize the extent to which these are extraordinary
individuals who, against enormous obstacles, managed to compensate for
their deficits through ingenious techniques of the self: diaries, alternative
personalities, and highly elaborate cognitive devices for processing experi-
ence and endowing it withmeaning ðWilliams 1992, pp. 18–20, 56; Grandin
1995, pp. 18–19, 95–97Þ. Nonetheless, even if the self-advocates themselves
remain sui generis, I would argue that the slot into which they stepped was
prepared for them by the processes described thus far. Perhaps the most ob-
vious point is that if autism had remained a relatively rare disorder and had
not been transformed by the therapies into a spectrum accommodating dif-
ferent levels of severity, it is highly unlikely that the self-advocates would
have been recognized as autistic, and their testimony would not have been
taken as relevant. For significant portions of their lives, indeed, they were
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considered “neurotic,” “psychotic,” “retarded,” “partially deaf,” or just plain
“weird,” but not autistic ðWilliams 1992, pp. 29, 64; Shore 2003, p. 38Þ.
Origins of the Autism EpidemicDeinstitutionalization and the normalization movement, moreover,
played a crucial role in setting up early self-advocacy. As early as 1972, aca-
demics and professionals in the UnitedKingdom acting as advocates for the
developmentally disabled organized “speaking up” events where disabled
individuals took the stage to advocate for themselves. The cultural reper-
toire of self-advocacy, at least in theUnited States and theUnitedKingdom,
was thus created by disability-rights advocates. This has meant that unlike
other countries where “speaking up” organizations developed under the
wing of parents’ organizations ðCanada, Denmark, JapanÞ, self-advocacy
in the United States and the United Kingdomwas marked from early on by
a certain tension with the aims of parents’ organizations ðBuchanan and
Walmsley 2006Þ. In recent years, this tension has exploded into open con-
flict, culminating in British patients with Asperger’s syndrome seceding
from the parent-led organization to form their own movement ðWing
2005Þ and an increasingly assertive younger generation of self-advocates
challenging parents ðSinclair 1993Þ. These self-advocates embrace the
notion that autism is not a disorder or even disability, but simply who they
are. They insist that they are not ill and do not need to be cured. They are
simply different, part of a wide spectrum of “neurodiversity.” Yet the par-
ents, they argue, are unable to tolerate this difference and instead keep look-
ing for a cure by all means ðsee http://autisticadvocacy.orgÞ. The parents of
severely disabled children, for their part, resent the neurodiversity talk as
glib and damaging to the cause of their own children.
Nonetheless, parents and parent organizations played a crucial role in
widening the spectrum to accommodate the self-advocates and in certifying
them as credible public representatives of autism. In the early 1970s, the
British and American parents’ associations collaborated in a project on the
“near normal autistic adolescent.” The project was coordinated by two
mothers who wrote an article suggesting that this group “would benefit . . .
from recognition of their condition as a separate category of autism” ðDewey
and Everard 1974, p. 355Þ. They also translated a lecture given by Hans
Asperger, thereby leading directly to Lorna Wing’s ð1981Þ seminal article
suggesting that Asperger’s disorder should be included within the autism
spectrum. Rimlandwrote the preface forWilliams’s book ð1992, pp. ix–xiiÞ,
essentially certifying that this was indeed a report about autism and not
something else ðWilliams herself only learned about autism in 1989, three
years before the book was written; Shore only in 1996 ½2003, p. 139Þ, and
he also wrote the blurb on the back cover of Grandin’s book.
Some of the language of the self-advocates, moreover, has unmistakable
affinities with Sensory Integration Therapy. Grandin ð1995, pp. 42–48Þ
says that the autism spectrum is a continuum of “sensory processing disor-
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der” and makes numerous references to sensory integration, as does Shore
ð2003, pp. 39–51Þ. This affinity is not accidental. We saw earlier how sen-
American Journal of Sociologysory integration therapy requires the active participation of the patient in
their own treatment, precisely because like Grandin or Williams, the child
knows more about the nature of his or her problem than the therapist. Au-
tism therapies constitute the patient as agent, as active participant in the di-
alogue and exchanges of which the network of expertise is made, playing a
role that is similar in principle—though obviously much different in scope
or impact—to the one played by the self-advocates. If the self-advocates
elaborated a language with which to represent a thick autistic person, the
therapies provided the grammar of this language. Ultimately, this affinity
rests on the profound transformation represented by deinstitutionalization.
Once autism was no longer an illness to be cured, nor a feeble mind in need
of custody, it became possible for it to be simply who one is, a subject about
whom the best testimony comes from his or her own lips.
The appearance of the self-advocates, therefore, can be explained within
the framework offered in this article. Their acrimonious debate with par-
ents’ organizations notwithstanding, the extension of the language of the
self-advocates to cover the whole spectrum, as well as the fact that they
constitute living proof that recovery is possible, made the autism diagnosis
vastly preferable—from the point of view of parents—to mental retardation,
with which it now overlapped significantly. The powerful idea encoded in
autism of a dormant potential that may be actualized; the greater availabil-
ity of therapies purporting to do just that; the empowerment of parents as
experts and cotherapists; the new needs and goals created by deinstitution-
alization; all these combined into a huge wave of diagnostic accretion and
substitution that followed hard on the heels of the DSM-III-R and the ap-
pearance of the self-advocates. There are various and competing estimates,
yet also agreement, that during the 1990s a sizable portion of the growth in
autism diagnoses could be directly imputed to diagnostic accretion and sub-
stitution from mental retardation ðShattuck 2006; Coo et al. 2008; King
2008; Bearman and King 2009Þ. Moreover, while this wave fed into the
“low-functioning” pole of the spectrum, there was in all likelihood another
pathway of diagnostic substitution, leading from less severe and “borderline”
diagnoses, like “specific language disorder,” into the “high-functioning” pole
of the spectrum ðBishop et al. 2008; Fombonne 2009Þ.CONCLUSIONIn this article, I argue that Abbott’s ð1988Þ call for a history of tasks and
problems can best be addressed by replacing the sociology of professions898
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with amore comprehensive project of sociology of expertise. This approach
combines the considerable achievements of jurisdictional analysis with an
Origins of the Autism Epidemicanalysis of how forms of expertise are gradually assembled. It differs from
the sociology of professions by being inclusive of all who can make viable
claims to expertise; by carefully distinguishing between experts and exper-
tise as twomodes of analysis that are not reducible to one another; by asking
not only who controls a task and how jurisdictional boundaries are assem-
bled but also what arrangements, devices, concepts, and other actors are
necessary if an expert statement or performance is to be formulated, repro-
duced, and disseminated as an immutable and combinable mobile. This
means that expertise is analyzed as a network and abstraction as a chain of
practical transcriptions, and that arguments about powermust take into ac-
count the distinction and dynamic interdependence between the monopoly
and autonomy experts pursue and the generosity and coproduction in-
volved in putting together robust networks of expertise. The approach de-
veloped here is thus particularly useful for investigating the dynamic causes
and effects involved in the elaboration of authoritative and socially conse-
quential forms of knowledge and expertise, examining not only how certain
problems—environmental risk, terrorism, pain, obesity, or minimal trau-
matic brain injury—rise to public attention ðor notÞ, orwho controls them, but
also the conditions and social work necessary to turn them into expert tasks.APPENDIXDSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for 299.00 Autistic Disorder
A. Six or more items from ð1Þ, ð2Þ, and ð3Þ, with at least two from ð1Þ, and
one each from ð2Þ and ð3Þ:
1. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at
least two of the following:
a. marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal beha-
viors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures,
and gestures to regulate social interaction
b. failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to develop-
mental level
c. a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or
achievements with other people ðe.g., by a lack of showing,
bringing, or pointing out objects of interestÞ
d. lack of social or emotional reciprocity
2. Qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at
least one of the following:899
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a. delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language
ðnot accompanied by an attempt to compensate through al-
American Journal of Sociologyternative modes of communication such as gesture or mimeÞ
b. in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in
the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others
c. stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic lan-
guage
d. lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imita-
tive play appropriate to developmental level
3. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, inter-
ests, and activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:
a. encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped
and restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in in-
tensity or focus
b. apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional rou-
tines or rituals
c. stereotyped and repetitive motor manners ðe.g., hand or fin-
ger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movementsÞ
d. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas,
with onset prior to age 3 years: ð1Þ social interaction, ð2Þ language as
used in social communication, or ð3Þ symbolic or imaginative play.
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for byRett’sDisorder orChild-
hood Disintegrative Disorder. ðDSM-IV 1994ÞREFERENCES
Abbott, Andrew. 1988. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert
Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1995. “Things of Boundaries.” Social Research 62 ðWinterÞ: 857–82.
———. 2001. Chaos of Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Abrahams, B. S., and D. H. Geschwind. 2008. “Advances in Autism Genetics: On the
Threshold of a New Neurobiology.” Nature Reviews: Genetics 9 ðMayÞ: 341–56.
Akerley, Mary S. 1979. “The Politics of Definitions.” Journal of Autism andDevelopmen-
tal Disorders 9 ð2Þ: 222–31.
American Psychiatric Association, Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics. 1968.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-II. Washington, D.C.:
American Psychiatric Association.
———. 1980.Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders: DSM-III. Washing-
ton, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.
———. 1987. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-III-R.
Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.
———. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV.
Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.900
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Amiet, C., et al. 2008. “Epilepsy in Autism Is Associated with Intellectual Disability




















Origins of the Autism Epidemic577–82.
ronson, Noami. 1982. “Nutrition as a Social Problem: A Case Study of Entrepreneurial
Strategy in Science.” Social Problems 29 ðJuneÞ: 474–87.
yres, Jean. 1974. Development of Sensory Integrative Theory and Practice. Dubuque,
Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co.
——. 1983. Sensory Integration and Learning Disorders. Los Angeles: Western Psy-
chological Services.
——. 1998. Sensory Integration and the Child. Los Angeles: Western Psychological
Services.
yres, Jean, and William Heskett. 1972. “Sensory Integrative Dysfunction in a Young
Schizophrenic Girl.” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 2 ð2Þ: 174–81.
earman, Peter, and Marissa King. 2009. “Diagnostic Change and the Increased Preva-
lence of Autism.” International Journal of Epidemiology 38 ð5Þ: 1224–34.
ender, Lauretta. 1953. “Childhood Schizophrenia.” Psychological Quarterly 27 ð4Þ:
663–81.
ernard, Sallie. 2004. “Association between Thimerosal-Containing Vaccine and Au-
tism.” Journal of the American Medical Association 291 ð2Þ: 180.
etancur, Catalina. 2011. “Etiological Heterogeneity in Autism Spectrum Disorders:
More than 100 Genetic and Genomic Disorders and Still Counting.” Brain Research
1380:42–77.
ettelheim, Bruno. 1967. The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self.
New York: Free Press.
ishop, Dorothy V.M., Andrew J. O.Whitehouse, Helen J.Watt, and Elizabeth A. Line.
2008. “Autism and Diagnostic Substitution: Evidence from a Study of Adults with a
History of Developmental Language Disorder.” Developmental Medicine and Child
Neurology 50:1–5.
lumer, Herbert. 1971. “Social Problems as Collective Behavior.” Social Problems 18:
298–306.
rockley, Janice. 2004. “Rearing the Child Who Never Grew: Ideologies of Parenting
and Intellectual Disability in American History.” Pp. 130–64 in Mental Retardation
in America: A Historical Reader, edited by Steven Noll and James W. Trent. New
York: New York University Press.
uchanan, I., and J. Walmsley. 2006. “Self-Advocacy in Historical Perspective.” British
Journal of Learning Disabilities 34 ð3Þ: 133–38.
ambrosio, Alberto, Camille Limoges, and Eric Hoffman. 1992. “Expertise as a Net-
work: A Case Study of the Controversies over the Environmental Release of Geneti-
cally Modified Organisms.” Pp. 341–61 in The Culture and Power of Knowledge,
edited by Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
aruso, Daniela. 2010. “Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change.”Amer-
ican Journal of Law and Medicine 36:483–539.
astles, Katherine. 2004. “‘Nice, Average Americans’: Postwar Parents’Groups and the
Defense of the Normal Family.” Pp. 351–68 inMental Retardation in America: A His-
torical Reader, edited by StevenNoll and JamesW. Trent. NewYork:NewYorkUni-
versity Press.
DC ðCenters for Disease Control and PreventionÞ. 2009. “Prevalence of Autism Spec-
trumDisorders—Autism andDevelopmental DisabilitiesMonitoringNetwork, United
States, 2006.” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report: Surveillance Summaries 58
ðDecemberÞ: 1–24.
——. 2012. “Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders—Autism and Developmental
Disabilities Monitoring Network, 14 Sites, United States, 2008.”Morbidity and Mor-
tality Weekly Report: Surveillance Summaries 61 ðMarchÞ: 1–19.901
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Clausen, John. 1966. “Mental Deficiency: Development of a Concept.” American Journal






























American Journal of Sociology
90ollins, H. M., and Robert Evans. 2002. “The ThirdWave of Science Studies: Studies of
Expertise and Experience.” Social Studies of Science 32 ð2Þ: 235–96.
——. 2007. Rethinking Expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
onrad, Peter, and Joseph Schneider. 1980. Deviance and Medicalization: From Bad-
ness to Sickness. St. Louis: Mosby.
oo, Helen, Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz, Jennifer E. V. Lloyd, Liza Kasmara, Jeanette J. A.
Holden, and M. E. Suzanne Lewis. 2008. “Trends in Autism Prevalence: Diagnostic
Substitution Revisited.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 38:1036–46.
roen, Lisa A., Judith K. Grether, Jenny Hoogstrate, and Steve Selvin. 2002. “The
Changing Prevalence of Autism in California.” Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders 32 ð3Þ: 207–15.
ewey, Margaret A., and Margaret P. Everard. 1974. “The Near-Normal Autistic Ado-
lescent.” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 4 ð4Þ: 348–56.
reyfus, Hubert. 1979.What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique. NewYork: Harper & Row.
reyfus, Hubert, and Stuart Dreyfus. 1986. Mind over Machine: The Power of Human
Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. New York: Free Press.
——. 2005. “Peripheral Vision: Expertise in Real World Contexts.” Organization Stud-
ies 26 ð5Þ: 779–92.
isenberg, Leon, and Leo Kanner. 1956. “Early Infantile Autism, 1943–1955.” American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 26:556–66.
pstein, Steven. 1995. “The Construction of Lay Expertise: Aids Activism and the Forg-
ing of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials.” Science, Technology, and Human
Values 20 ð4Þ: 408–37.
——. 1996. Impure Science: Aids, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
elds, Suzanne. 1975. “Parents as Therapists.” Innovations 2 ðFallÞ: 3–8.
mbonne, Eric. 1999. “The Epidemiology of Autism: A Review.” Psychological Medi-
cine 29:769–86.
——. 2009. “Commentary: OnKing andBearman.” International Journal of Epidemi-
ology 38 ð5Þ: 1241–42.
ucault, Michel. 1972. The Archeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock.
——. 1973. The Birth of the Clinic. London: Tavistock.
——. 1975. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books.
——. 1976. The History of Sexuality: Introduction. New York: Vintage Books.
iedson, Eliott. 1970. Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
——. 1986. Professional Powers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
adamer, Hans-Georg. 1996. The Enigma of Health. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
illberg, Christopher. 1998. “Asperger Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism.” Brit-
ish Journal of Psychiatry 172:200–209.
randin, Temple. 1986. Emergence: Labeled Autistic. New York: Warner Books.
——. 1995. Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism. New York: Vintage.
reen, Vanessa A., Keenan A. Pituch, Jonathan Itchon, Aram Choi, Mark O’Reilly, and
Jeff Sigafoos. 2006. “Internet Survey of Treatments Used by Parents of Children with
Autism.” Research in Developmental Disabilities 27:70–84.
rinker, Roy Richard. 2007. Unstrange Minds: Remapping the World of Autism. New
York: Basic Books.
usfield, Joseph R. 1981. The Culture of Public Problems. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
acking, Ian. 2009. “Autistic Autobiographies.” Philosophical Transactions of the Brit-
ish Royal Society, B, 364:1467–73.
2
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Haydu, Jeffrey. 1998. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and
























Origins of the Autism Epidemiceritage, John, andDouglasW.Maynard. 2006. “Problems and Prospects in the Study of
Physician-Patient Interaction: 30 Years of Research.” Annual Review of Sociology
32:351–74.
ersch, Charles. 1968. “The Discontent Explosion in Mental Health.” American Psy-
chologist 23:497–508.
ilgartner, Stephan, and Charles L. Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems:
A Public Arenas Model.” American Journal of Sociology 94 ðJulyÞ: 53–78.
owlin, Patricia. 1997. “Prognosis in Autism: Do Specialist Treatments Affect Long-
Term Outcomes?” European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 6:55–72.
nes, Kathleen W. 1999. Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child
Guidance and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
——. 2004. “Education for Children with Mental Retardation: Parent Activism, Pub-
lic Policy, and Family Ideology in the 1950s.” Pp. 322–48 in Mental Retardation in
America: A Historical Reader, edited by Steven Noll and JamesW. Trent. New York:
New York University Press.
anner, Leo. 1941. In Defense of Mothers: How to Bring Up Children in Spite of the
More Zealous Psychologists. New York: Dodd, Mead.
——. ð1943Þ 1973. “Autistic Disturbances ofAffective Contact.”Pp. 1–43 inChildhood
Psychosis: Initial Studies and New Insights. Washington, D.C.:Winston & Sons. ðRe-
print of “Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact.” Nervous Child 2:217–50.Þ
——. 1949. Feeblemindedness: Absolute, Relative and Apparent. Child Care Mono-
graphs. New York: Child Care Publications.
——. 1964. History of the Care and Study of the Mentally Retarded. Springfield, Ill.:
Charles C. Thomas.
——. 1965. “Infantile Autism and the Schizophrenias.” Behavioral Science 10 ð4Þ:
412–20.
——. 1971. “Follow-Up Study of Eleven Autistic Children.” Journal of Autism and
Childhood Schizophrenia 1 ð2Þ: 119–45.
eating, Peter, andAlberto Cambrosio. 2003.Biomedical Platforms: Realigning theNor-
mal and the Pathological in Late-Twentieth-Century Medicine. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
ing,Marissa D. 2008. “Diagnosis, Substitution, andDiffusion in the AutismEpidemic.”
Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University, Department of Sociology.
line, Wendy. 2001. Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality and Eugenics from the
Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
oenig, Kathleen, Emily Rubin, Ami Klin, and Fred R. Volkmar. 2000. “Autism and the
Pervasive Developmental Disorders.” Pages 298–310 in Handbook of Infant Mental
Health, edited by Charles H. Zeanah. New York: Guilford Press.
rug, David A., Joel R. Arick, and Patricia Almond. 1980. “Behavior Checklist for Iden-
tifying Severely Handicapped Individuals with High Levels of Autistic Behavior.”
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 21:221–29.
koff, Andrew. 2005.PharmaceuticalReason. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
ne, Pam. 2008. “A Brief History of How We Began.” Autism Matters 1 ð2Þ: 3–4.
ngone, John. 1974. Goodbye to Bedlam: Understanding Mental Illness and Retarda-
tion. Boston: Little, Brown.
tour, Bruno. 1987.Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists andEngineers through
Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
——. 1988. The Pasteurization of France. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
——. 1999. “Circulating Reference.” Chap. 2 in Pandora’s Hope. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
903This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
























American Journal of Sociology
90rner, Barron. 2006. When Illness Goes Public. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
ttick, Amy L. 1979. Benhaven Then and Now. New Haven, Conn.: Benhaven Press.
u, Ka-Yuet, Marissa King, and Peter S. Bearman. 2010. “Social Influence and the Au-
tism Epidemic.” American Journal of Sociology 115 ð5Þ: 1389–1434.
vaas, O. Ivar. 1979. “Contrasting Illness and Behavioral Models for the Treatment of
Autistic Children: AHistorical Perspective.” Journal of Autism andChildhood Schizo-
phrenia 9 ð4Þ: 315–23.
——. 1981. Teaching Developmentally Disabled Children: The Me Book. Baltimore:
University Park Press.
——. 1993. “The Development of a Treatment-Research Project for Developmentally
Disabled and Autistic Children.” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 26 ðWinterÞ:
617–30.
alzberg, Benjamin. 1952. “Some Statistical Aspects of First Admissions to the New
York State Schools for Mental Defectives.” American Journal of Mental Deficiency
57:27–37.
ay, Jacques M. 1958. A Physician Looks at Psychiatry. New York: John Day.
cGee, Gail G. 1985. “The Facilitative Effects of Incidental Teaching on Preposition
Use by Autistic Children.” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 18 ðSpringÞ: 17–31.
edical World News. 1966. “Breaking Through to the Autistic Child.” Medical World
News 7:85–92.
osse, Hilde L. 1958. “The Misuse of the Diagnosis Childhood Schizophrenia.” Ameri-
can Journal of Psychiatry 114 ðMarchÞ: 791–94.
adesan, Majia Holmer. 2005. Constructing Autism: Unravelling the “Truth” and Un-
derstanding the Social. London: Routledge.
ehring,Wendy. 2004. “Formal Health Care at the Community Level: The Child Devel-
opment Clinics of the 1950s and 1960s.” Pp. 371–83 inMental Retardation in America:
A Historical Reader, edited by Steven Noll and James W. Trent. New York: New
York University Press.
oll, Steven. 1995. Feeble-Minded in Our Midst: Institutions for the Mentally Retarded
in the South, 1900–1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
orsworthy, Naomi. 1906. “The Psychology ofMentally Deficient Children.”Archives of
Psychology 1 ð1Þ: 1–111.
rnitz, Edward M., and Edward R. Ritvo. 1968. “Perceptual Inconstancy in Early In-
fantile Autism: The Syndrome of Early Infant Autism and Its Variants including Cer-
tain Cases of Childhood Schizophrenia.”Archives of General Psychiatry 18 ð1Þ: 76–98.
rk, Clara Claiborne. 1971. “Schopler’s Developmental Therapy to Support Unique
Public School Program.” NSAC Newsletter 3 ð7Þ: 3–5.
rk, David. 1974. “Operant Conditioning of a Speaking Autistic Child.” Journal of Au-
tism and Childhood Schizophrenia 4 ð2Þ: 189–91.
ttus, Ashley. 2008. “A Spectrum of Disorders: The Urgent Search to Understand the
Biological Basis of Autism.” Harvard Magazine 110 ðJanuary/FebruaryÞ: 3.
ior,Margot. 2003. “Annotation: Is There an Increase in the Prevalence of Autism Spec-
trum Disorders?” Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 39:81–82.
outy, Robert, K. Charlie Lakin, Kathryn Coucouvanis, and Linda Anderson. 2005.
“Progress toward a National Objective of Healthy People 2010: ‘Reduce to Zero the
Number of Children 17 Years and Younger Living in Congregate Care.’”Mental Re-
tardation 43 ð6Þ: 456–60.
outy, Robert W., Gary Smith, and K. Charlie Lakin. 2001. Residential Services for
Persons withDevelopmental Disabilities: Status and Trends through 2000. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota, Research and Training Center on Community Living.4
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
———. 2007. Residential Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: Status



















Origins of the Autism Epidemicing Center on Community Living.
abeharisoa, Vololona, andMichel Callon. 2004. “Patients and Scientists in FrenchMus-
cular Dystrophy Research.” Pp. 142–60 in States of Knowledge: The Co-production of
Science and Social Order, edited by Sheila Jasanoff. London: Routledge.
apin, Isabelle. 1994. “Introduction and Overview.” Pp. 1–17 in The Neurobiology of
Autism, edited by Margaret L. Bauman and Thomas L. Kemper. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
imland, Bernard. 1964. Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for aNeu-
ral Theory of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
——. 1968. “On the Objective Diagnosis of Infantile Autism.” Acta Paedopsychiatrica
35:146–61.
——. 1971. “The Differentiation of Childhood Psychoses: An Analysis of Checklists
for 2,218 Psychotic Children.” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 1 ð2Þ:
161–74.
——. 1972. “Operant Conditioning: Breakthrough in the Treatment of Mentally Ill
Children.” Pp. 573–86 in Readings on the Exceptional Child, 2nd ed., edited by E.
Philip Trapp and Philip Himelstein. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
——. 2006. “The History of the Autism Research Institute and the Defeat Autism
Now! ðDAN!Þ Project.” Pp. 1–61 in Recovering Autistic Children, edited by Stephen
M. Edelson and Bernard Rimland. San Diego, Calif.: Autism Research Institute.
itvo, Edward R., Betty Jo Freeman, and National Society for Autistic Children. 1978.
“National Society for Autistic Children Definition of the Syndrome of Autism.” Jour-
nal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 8:162–67.
oberts, Eric M., Paul B. English, Judith K. Grether, Gayle C. Windham, Lucia Som-
berg, and Craig Wolff. 2007. “Maternal Residence Near Agricultural Pesticide Appli-
cations and Autism Spectrum Disorders among Children in the California Central
Valley.” Environmental Health Perspectives 115 ð10Þ: 1482–89.
ogers, Sally J., and Laurie A. Vismara. 2008. “Evidence-Based Comprehensive Treat-
ments for Early Autism.” Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology 37:1,
8–38.
onald, Angelica, et al. 2006. “Genetic Heterogeneity between the Three Components of
the Autism Spectrum: A Twin Study.” Journal of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry 45:691–99.
ose, Nikolas. 1992. “Engineering theHuman Soul: Analyzing Psychological Expertise.”
Science in Context 5 ð2Þ: 351–69.
utter, Michael. 1972. “Childhood Schizophrenia Reconsidered.” Journal of Autism and
Childhood Schizophrenia 2 ð4Þ: 315–37.
——. 1978. “Diagnosis and Definition of Childhood Autism.” Journal of Autism and
Childhood Schizophrenia 8:139–61.
——. 1983. “The Treatment of Autistic Children.” Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry 26 ð2Þ: 193–214.
utter, Michael, and Fraida Sussenwein. 1971. “A Developmental and Behavioral Ap-
proach to the Treatment of Preschool Autistic Children.” Journal of Autism and Child-
hood Schizophrenia 1 ð4Þ: 376–97.
hopler, Eric. 1971a. “Introductory Remarks.” Pp. 75–76 in Research and Education:
Top Priorities for Mentally Ill Children; Proceedings of the Conference and Annual
Meeting of the National Society for Autistic Children, San Francisco June 24–27,
1970, edited byClara Claiborne Park. Rockville,Md.: U.S. Department ofHealth, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare.
——. 1971b. “Parents of Psychotic Children as Scapegoats.” Journal of Contemporary
Psychotherapy 4 ð1Þ: 17–22.905
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
———. 1978. “On Confusion in the Diagnosis of Autism.” Journal of Autism and Child-
























American Journal of Sociology
90hopler, Eric, and Robert J. Reichler. 1971. “Parents as Co-Therapists in the Treatment
of Psychotic Children.” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 1 ð1Þ: 87–102.
——. 1972. “HowWell Do Parents Understand Their Own Psychotic Child?” Journal
of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 2 ð4Þ: 387–400.
——. 1976. Psychopathology and Child Development: Research and Treatment. New
York: Plenum Press.
hopler, Eric, Robert J. Reichler, Robert F. DeVellis, andKennethDaly. 1980. “Toward
Objective Classification of Childhood Autism: Childhood Autism Rating Scale
ðCARSÞ.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 10 ð1Þ: 91–103.
humacher, HenryC. 1946. “AProgram forDealingwithMental Deficiency in Children
Up to Six Years of Age.” American Journal of Mental Deficiency 51 ð1Þ: 52–56.
apiro, Joseph P. 1993. No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement. New York: Times Books.
attuck, Paul T. 2006. “The Contribution of Diagnostic Substitution to the Growing
Administrative Prevalence of Autism in U.S. Special Education.” Pediatrics 117 ð4Þ:
1028–37.
ore, Stephen M. 2003. Beyond the Wall: Personal Experiences with Autism and As-
perger Syndrome, 2d ed. Shawnee Mission, Kan.: Autism Asperger Publishing.
egel, Bryna. 1996. TheWorld of the Autistic Child: Understanding and Treating Autis-
tic Spectrum Disorders. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
lverman, Chloe. 2004. “A Disorder of Affect: Love, Tragedy, Biomedicine, and Citi-
zenship in American Autism Research, 1943–2003.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Pennsylvania.
——. 2012. Understanding Autism: Parents, Doctors and the History of a Disorder.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
nclair, Jim. 1993. Don’t Mourn for Us. http://www.autreat.com/dont_mourn.html.
itz, René A. 1945. “Hospitalism? An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions
in Early Childhood.” Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 1:53–74.
llivan, Ruth Christ. 1984. “Parents as Trainers of Legislators, Other Parents, and Re-
searchers.” Pp. 233–46 in The Effects of Autism on the Family, edited by Eric Schopler
and Gary Mesibov. New York: Plenum Press.
mmerson Carr, E. 2010. “Enactments of Expertise.” Annual Review of Anthropology
39:17–32.
atmari, P., et al. 2007. “Mapping Autism Risk Loci Using Genetic Linkage and Chro-
mosomal Rearrangements.” Nature Genetics 39:319–28.
ammet, Daniel. 2009. Embracing the Wide Sky: A Tour across the Horizons of the
Mind. New York: Free Press.
redgold, A. F. ð1908Þ 1947. A Textbook of Mental Deficiency. Baltimore: Williams &
Wilkins.
rent, James W. 1994. Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation in
the United States. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
olkmar, Fred R., Szatmari, Peter, and Sarah S. Sparrow. 1993. “Sex Differences in
Pervasive Developmental Disorders.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
23 ð4Þ: 579–91.
aldman, Michael, Sean Nicholson, and Nodir Adilov. 2006. “Does Television Cause
Autism?” Working Paper No. 12632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
allin, J. E. Wallace. 1949. Children with Mental and Physical Handicaps. New York:
Prentice-Hall.
arren, Frank. 1984. “The Role of the National Society in Working with Families.” In
The Effects of Autism on the Family, edited by Eric Schopler and Gary Mesibov. New
York: Plenum Press.
6
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Waterhouse, Lynn, Deborah Fein, L. Nath, and D. Snyder. 1987. “Pervasive Develop-
mental Disorders and Schizophrenia Occurring in Childhood: A Critical Commen-
Origins of the Autism Epidemictary.” Pp. 335–68 in Diagnosis and Classification in Psychiatry, edited by Gary L.
Tischler. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Waterhouse, Lynn, Deborah Fein, and Emily G.W. Nichols. 2007. “Autism, Social Neu-
roscience and Endophenotypes.” Pp. 307–36 in Autism and Pervasive Developmental
Disorders, 2d ed. Edited by Fred Volkmar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waterhouse, Lynn, LornaWing, Robert Spitzer, and Bryna Siegel. 1992. “Pervasive De-
velopmental Disorders: From DSM-III to DSM-III-R.” Journal of Autism and Devel-
opmental Disorders 22 ð4Þ: 525–49.
Weber, Max. 1963. The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon Press.
Whooley, Owen. 2010. “Diagnostic Ambivalence: Psychiatric Workarounds and the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.” Sociology of Health and Ill-
ness 32 ð3Þ: 452–69.
Williams, Donna. 1992.NobodyNowhere: TheExtraordinary Autobiography of an Autis-
tic. New York: Times Books.
———. 1994. Somebody Somewhere: Breaking Free from the World of Autism. New
York: Times Books.
Williams, Raymond. 1976. Keywords. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wing, Lorna. 1973. “The Handicaps of Autistic Children: A Review of Some Aspects of
Work in the U.K.” Pp. 106–22 in Research and Education: Top Priorities for Mentally
Ill Children; Proceedings of the Conference and Annual Meeting of the National Soci-
ety for Autistic Children, San Francisco June 22–24, 1971, edited by Clara Claiborne
Park. Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health.
———. 1981. “Asperger’s Syndrome: A Clinical Account.” Psychological Medicine 11:
115–29.
———. 1997. “The Autistic Spectrum.” Lancet 350 ðDecember 13Þ: 1761–66.
———. 2005. “Reflections on Opening Pandora’s Box.” Journal of Autism and Develop-
mental Disorders 35 ð2Þ: 197–203.
———. 2008. “Interview.” http://www.autismconnect.org.uk/core_files/interviews
/transcripts/ lorna_wing.htm.
Wing, Lorna, and JudithGould. 1979. “Severe Impairments of Social Interaction andAs-
sociated Abnormalities in Children: Epidemiology and Classification.” Journal of Au-
tism and Developmental Disorders 9 ð1Þ: 11–29.
Wolfensberger, Wolf. 1972. Normalization: The Principle of Normalization in Human
Services. Toronto: National Institute of Mental Retardation, Canadian Association
for the Mentally Retarded.
Wynne, Brian. 1996. “Misunderstood Misunderstandings: Social Identities and the Pub-
lic Uptake of Science.” Pages 19–46 inMisunderstanding Science? The Public Recon-
struction of Science and Technology, edited by Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yeargin-Allsopp, Marshalyn, Catherine Rice, Tanya Karapurkar, Nancy Doernberg,
Coleen Boyle, and Catherine Murphy. 2003. “Prevalence of Autism in a U.S. Metro-
politan Area.” JAMA 289 ð1Þ: 49–55.
Zola, Irving Kenneth. 1972. “Medicine as an Institution of Social Control.” Sociological
Review 20:487–504.907
This content downloaded from 160.39.170.229 on Thu, 30 Jul 2015 15:37:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
